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Abstract
We present a polynomial-time algorithm that, given samples from the unknown
valuation distribution of each bidder, learns an auction that approximately maxi-
mizes the auctioneer’s revenue in a variety of single-parameter auction environments
including matroid environments, position environments, and the public project en-
vironment. The valuation distributions may be arbitrary bounded distributions
(in particular, they may be irregular, and may differ for the various bidders), thus
resolving a problem left open by previous papers. The analysis uses basic tools, is
performed in its entirety in value-space, and simplifies the analysis of previously
known results for special cases. Furthermore, the analysis extends to certain single-
parameter auction environments where precise revenue maximization is known to
be intractable, such as knapsack environments.
1 Introduction
We start by considering auctions of a single item to n bidders (we later extend our results
beyond the single-item auction environment). The value (i.e., maximum willingness to
pay) vi for the item of each bidder i is distributed according to some unknown (perhaps
irregular) distribution Fi that is supported on a known bounded interval [0, H], and the
values of the bidders are drawn independently of each other. An auctioneer is given
t = poly(H,n, 1/ε) random samples from each Fi, and aims to design an auction that,
with high probability, approximately maximizes her revenue from (future bidders with
values drawn from) F1 × · · · × Fn. (I.e., the goal is to PAC learn a revenue-maximizing
auction.)
The most natural approach would be to take, for each bidder i, the empirical dis-
tribution Fˆi defined as the uniform distribution over the (multi)set of the t samples
from Fi, and design an auction that maximizes the empirical revenue, i.e., the revenue
from Fˆ1 × · · · × Fˆn. One would hope that the resulting auction would approximately
maximize the revenue from F1 × · · · × Fn as well.
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Unfortunately, such an approach may be prone to overfitting the samples, in which
case the empirical-revenue-maximizing auction may perform poorly on F1 × · · · × Fn.
Therefore, recent papers have focused on designing auctions that approximately maximize
the empirical revenue, in a way that is robust against overfitting.1 These papers combine
the delicate understanding of the nature of optimal auctions due to Myerson (1981) with
various techniques of converting an auction that is good for variants of the empirical
distribution to one that is good for the original distribution, in several special cases: a
single buyer with a regular value distribution (Huang et al., 2015), multiple buyers with
regular distributions (Cole and Roughgarden, 2014; Devanur et al., 20162), and multiple
buyers with i.i.d. irregular distributions (Roughgarden and Schrijvers, 2016). The general
case (i.e., that of non-i.i.d., possibly irregular, distributions) remained an open problem
(Morgenstern, 2016), even though it was shown that, information-theoretically, it should
be possible (Morgenstern and Roughgarden, 2015).
In this paper, we resolve the above-described open problem by showing how to take the
auction that is optimal for the empirical sampled distribution Fˆ1×· · ·×Fˆn, and efficiently
“round” it to integer multiples of ε in a way that ensures that the rounded auction is
near-optimal also for the original distribution F1×· · ·×Fn. The analysis uses basic tools,
is performed in its entirety in value-space (rather than quantile-space, or “virtual-value”-
space), and also simplifies the analysis of above-described previously known results for
special cases. We now give a high-level review of our analysis for the basic case of a single-
item auction. In Section 6, we extend our analysis to a variety of single-parameter auction
environments including matroid environments, position environments, and the public
project environment, as well as to certain single-parameter auction environments where
precise revenue maximization is known to be intractable, such as knapsack environments.
We start by defining what we mean by “rounding” an auction. To do so, we view
the domain [0, H] of the possible valuations (values) of each bidder as composed of the
disjoint union of the semiopen ε-intervals
[
j · ε, (j + 1) · ε) for j = 0, . . . ,H/ε.
Definition 1.1 (ε-Coarse Auction; ε-Rounding).
• We call an auction ε-coarse if its outcome, i.e., (item) allocation and payment, is
constant within each product of ε-intervals. That is, the outcome of an ε-coarse
auction for bids v1, . . . , vn depends only on the indices j1, . . . , jn of the ε-intervals
to which the bids v1, . . . , vn respectively belong (i.e., ji · ε ≤ vi < (ji + 1) · ε for
every i).
• We ε-round an auction A to an ε-coarse auction A′ by choosing for each ε-interval j
of each bidder i a fixed value vij ∈
[
j · ε, (j + 1) · ε) in that ε-interval, and defining
the allocation rule of the auction A′ to treat all bids of bidder i in that ε-interval
as the auction A treats vij. In other words, A
′ is the unique ε-coarse auction whose
allocation on every tuple (v1j1 , . . . , v
n
jn) of these chosen values is identical to that
of A. The payments of A′ are defined to be the unique payments that make it
incentive compatible, and are thus generally not identical to those of A.
1It is nonetheless still not entirely clear whether overfitting can actually occur with nonnegligible
probability for bounded valuation distributions.
2The authors of Devanur et al. (2016) have recently notified us (personal communication, April 2017)
that it turns out that their techniques can be generalized to also yield a result similar to our Theorem 1.4,
along with a few special cases of our Theorem 1.5. The updated version of their paper is now available
on arXiv.org.
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Our notion of rounding auctions allows for many different ways of ε-rounding any
given auction, depending on the choice of the values vij. One might hope that all of these
roundings achieve approximately the same revenue as the original auction, but that is
not the case.3 Our main lemma shows that some ε-rounding of any given auction does
achieve approximately the revenue of the nonrounded auction. Moreover, for an auction
that is optimal for the product of uniform distributions over finite sets of (sampled)
values, finding such an ε-rounding can be done in polynomial time.
Lemma 1.2 (See also Propositions 3.7 and 4.3).
a. For every product distribution F1×· · ·×Fn and auction A, there exists an ε-coarse
auction A′ that is an ε-rounding of A and whose revenue from F1× · · · ×Fn is less
than an additive ε smaller than that of A.
b. There exists a deterministic algorithm that runs in time poly(H,n, 1/ε, t), takes as
input i) a product distribution Fˆ1×· · ·×Fˆn where each Fˆi is uniform over a multiset
of t (sampled) values, and ii) an auction A that is optimal for Fˆ1 × · · · × Fˆn, and
outputs an ε-coarse auction A′ that is an ε-rounding of A and whose revenue from
Fˆ1 × · · · × Fˆn is less than an additive nε smaller than that of A.
As opposed to existing auction-rounding schemes in the literature (Hart and Nisan,
2013; Dughmi et al., 2014), the rounding in Lemma 1.2 is not “universal” for all dis-
tributions (i.e., the rounded auction A′ does not approximate the revenue of A on all
product distributions), but rather needs to be tailored specifically for F1 × · · · × Fn.4
Furthermore, as opposed to Devanur et al. (2016), we round the optimal auction for the
empirical distribution, rather than find the optimal auction for a discretized version of
the empirical distribution. Our algorithm considers a randomized rounding, where all
values j · ε ≤ vi < (j+ 1) · ε are rounded to a fixed value vij that is itself randomly chosen
according to the distribution Fi conditioned on being in this ε-interval. We show that the
expected revenue of the resulting auction (or more accurately, distribution over auctions)
is within less than an additive ε of the revenue of A, and so some deterministic auction
within this distribution over auctions loses less than an additive ε in revenue compared
to A. When for every i ∈ N it is the case that Fi = Fˆi is a uniform distribution over
a multiset of t (sampled) values, our algorithm deterministically and efficiently searches
for a deterministic auction that loses less than an additive nε, within the above-defined
randomized distribution over possible roundings.
Once we have Lemma 1.2, the algorithm for empirical revenue maximization is simple:
Let A be Myerson’s optimal auction for the empirically sampled product distribution
3While it is true that the price paid by a bidder i for winning the item in a rounded auction is indeed
approximately the same whether or not we round all bids of that bidder, there are two complications:
the minor one is that bids of bidder i that used to win the item in the original auction may cease to
do so in the rounded auction; the major one is that in the original auction, tiny changes in the bid of
bidder i may result in arbitrary changes in the payment of another bidder j.
4We show that this is unavoidable by giving an example of a two-bidder auction that is optimal for
some product of regular distributions and yet for every ε > 0, every ε-coarse auction must lose Ω(1) (i.e.,
at least some constant independent of ε) revenue for some valuation profile (v1, v2). This is in contrast
to the case of i.i.d. distributions, for which we show in Appendix C how to ε-round any auction that is
optimal for some Fn = F × · · · × F into a single ε-coarse auction that loses less than an additive ε in
revenue universally for every profile of valuations (v1, . . . , vn), and thus also for every distribution. This
implies a simplified proof for the recent result of Roughgarden and Schrijvers (2016) for the i.i.d. case,
and highlights the difference between the general case considered here and the i.i.d. case.
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Fˆ1×· · ·× Fˆn (which is readily computed from the samples as spelled out in Elkind, 2007),
and output the ε-rounded approximately optimal auction A′ produced by the rounding
algorithm for A, tailored to lose less than nε revenue on Fˆ1×· · ·×Fˆn. When the ε-rounding
algorithm is applied to Myerson’s (ironed-virtual-welfare maximizing) optimal auction A,
the resulting ε-coarse auction A′ turns out to be of the following simple form:
Definition 1.3 ((H, ε)-simple auction). We call an auction (H, ε)-simple if there exists a
sequence P of distinct pairs of the form (i, j) where i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and j ∈ {0, . . . , bH/εc},
such that the winner is always the first bidder i in the order P that has vi ≥ j · ε, and
the winner’s payment is always the threshold value required to win.5
As (H, ε)-simple auctions have a concise polynomial-length description (the sequence
P ), basic learning-theory intuition implies that overfitting can be ruled out. Specifically,
we apply an elegant concentration inequality due to Babichenko et al. (2017) (see also
Devanur et al., 2016), which shows that the revenue of any fixed auction from the product
of the empirically sampled distributions well approximates its revenue from the product
of the true distributions. We then conclude by taking a union bound over the small
number of (H, ε)-simple auctions to obtain our main theorem:
Theorem 1.4 (See also Theorem 5.7). There exists a deterministic algorithm that runs in
time poly(H,n, 1/ε, log 1/δ), takes as input t = poly(H,n, 1/ε, log 1/δ) random samples from
unknown distributions F1, . . . , Fn supported on [0, H] and, with probability at least 1−δ,
outputs a description of an n-bidder single-item auction that maximizes the revenue from
F1 × · · · × Fn up to less than an additive ε. The produced auction is an ( εn+2 , H)-simple
ε
n+2
-rounding of the auction that maximizes revenue from the empirical product of the
uniform distributions over the samples.
As Myerson’s characterization of optimal auctions applies to general single-parameter
auction environments, we are able to generalize Theorem 1.4 to a wide variety of compu-
tationally tractable single-parameter environments by employing similar, yet somewhat
more delicate, analysis. First, our main ingredient, Lemma 1.2(a), readily generalizes to
arbitrary single-parameter environments, with the error term multiplied by the expected
“number of winners”. Nevertheless, it is not possible to generalize Lemma 1.2(b) since
the underlying algorithm requires the ability to compute the expected overall revenue of
an auction, which may be computationally intractable even for computationally tractable
environments. Therefore, we instead take a different approach to prove an analogue of
Lemma 1.2(b), by applying random sampling and then derandomizing the process using
random bits obtained from the order in which (polynomially many) samples are drawn.
Finally, while bounding the number of resulting ε-coarse auctions is easy in some environ-
ments, a more sophisticated argument based on Cramer’s rule is required more generally.6
Putting all of these together, we derive the following generalization of Theorem 1.4, which
also pushes the boundary of the set of environments that previous papers handled even
for the special cases of regular or i.i.d. distributions:
5 This may be viewed as an ε-discretized variant of the “leveled auctions” of Morgenstern and Rough-
garden (2015), albeit with more freedom in tie breaking; this finite discretization is exactly what allows
us to provide an efficient algorithm rather than an information-theoretic result. The way we bound the
number of (H, ε)-simple auctions is reminiscent of the way in which Devanur et al. (2016) bound the
number of optimal auctions on a finite valuation space.
6We are not aware of the use of any similar argument in the literature on mechanism design, and
hope that this type of argument may find additional uses in similar contexts in the future.
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Theorem 1.5 (See also Theorem 6.10 and Remark 6.11). For a class of single-parameter
auction environments including computationally tractable deterministic environments
(such as matroid environments and the public project environment) and position environ-
ments, there exists a deterministic algorithm that runs in time poly(H,n, 1/ε, log 1/δ), takes
as input t = poly(H,n, 1/ε, log 1/δ) random samples from unknown distributions F1, . . . , Fn
supported on [0, H] and, with probability at least 1−δ, outputs a description of an n-bidder
auction for the given auction environment that maximizes the revenue from F1×· · ·×Fn
up to less than an additive ε.
Finally, for single-parameter auction environments where precise revenue maximiza-
tion is known to be intractable, but where efficient approximate revenue maximization
up to some multiplicative factor C is possible, we prove, under certain assumptions on
this up-to-C maximization algorithm (that are satisfied, e.g., in the case of knapsack
environments), a generalization of Theorem 6.10, providing a deterministic polynomial-
time algorithm that learns from polynomially many samples a tractable auction that with
high probability approximates the maximum revenue from F1 × · · · × Fn up to the same
multiplicative factor of C, plus less than an additive ε. (See Theorem 6.14.) As with The-
orem 1.5, this result also pushes the boundary of the set of environments that previous
papers handled even for the special cases of regular or i.i.d. distributions.
1.1 Structure
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides definitions and
some background, Section 3 provides the derivation of Lemma 1.2(a), Section 4 provides
the derivation of Lemma 1.2(b), and Section 5 provides the remainder of the derivation
of Theorem 1.4. In Section 6, we extend the above single-item analysis to more general
single-parameter auction environments, and derive Theorem 1.5 and its generalization for
single-parameter auction environments where precise revenue maximization is intractable.
Some examples referenced in this paper are relegated to Appendix A, and the proofs
of some of the results stated throughout this paper are relegated to Appendix B. As
mentioned above, Appendix C presents an analogous (yet simpler) analysis for the special
case of i.i.d. distributions, where distribution-independent rounding of optimal auctions
is possible.
2 Model, Definitions, and Background
2.1 Auctions
The auctions we consider are deterministic direct-revelation dominant-strategy incentive-
compatible (DSIC) and ex-post individually rational (IR) single-item auctions among n
bidders numbered N , {1, 2, . . . , n}, each having a valuation (value) in [0, H] for some
H ∈ R+ that is known to the auctioneer. We denote by rA(v1, . . . , vn) the revenue
of auction A when the bidders have values v1, . . . , vn, and for every i ∈ N , denote by
rAi (v1, . . . , vn) the revenue of auction A from bidder i (i.e., the payment of bidder i) when
the bidders have values v1, . . . , vn. (So r
A(v1, . . . , vn) =
∑
i r
A
i (v1, . . . , vn).) We further-
more denote by rAi (vi) , E∀j 6=i:vj∼Fj rAi (v1, . . . , vn) the expected revenue of auction A from
bidder i, when bidder i has value vi and the valuations of all other bidders j are inde-
pendently drawn from the respective distributions Fj, which will be clear from context.
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The overall revenue of auction A from a product distribution F1× · · · ×Fn is denoted by
RevA(F1 × · · · × Fn) , Ev1∼F1,...,vn∼Fn rA(v1, . . . , vn).
2.2 Rounding
We now make Definition 1.1 from Section 1 precise, and provide some supporting notation.
Definition 2.1 (ε-Interval). Let ε > 0. An ε-interval is a semiopen interval of the form[
j · ε, (j + 1) · ε) for some integer j ∈ {0, . . . , bH/εc}. We say that j is the index of this
ε-interval.
Definition 2.2 (ε-Coarse Auction). Let ε > 0. An n-bidder auction A (for val-
uations in [0, H]) is said to be ε-coarse, if for every pair of valuations profiles
(v1, . . . , vn), (w1, . . . , wn) ∈ [0, H]n such that for every i ∈ N there exists ji such that
vi, wi ∈
[
ji · ε, (ji + 1) · ε
)
, the outcome (allocation and payment) of A is the same for
(v1, . . . , vn) and for (w1, . . . , wn).
We next define how auctions can be “rounded” into coarse ones, using a sequence of
“rounding actions.”
Definition 2.3 (ε-Rounding). Let A be an n-bidder auction and let ε > 0.
• An ε-rounding action is a triplet (i, j, vij) where i ∈ N is a bidder, j is an index
of an ε-interval, and vij ∈
[
j · ε, (j + 1) · ε) is a value in that ε-interval. Applying
the ε-rounding action (i, j, vij) to the auction A yields an auction A
′ having the
following allocation rule: given bids v1, . . . , vn, if vi ∈
[
j · ε, (j+ 1) · ε), then change
the bid of vi to v
i
j (for other bidders, or for the ith bidder if her value is not in
this ε-interval, keep the original bid unchanged), and then run the allocation rule
of A on the (possibly) updated values. The payment rule of A′ is not directly taken
from A, but is rather what is needed to ensure truthfulness: each winning bidder
pays her minimal winning bid (i.e., the infimum of all bids that would have still
allowed her to win when the bids of all other bidders are unchanged).
• An ε-rounding rule is a collection of ε-rounding actions (i, j, vij), one action for
each pair of bidder i ∈ N and index j ∈ {0, . . . , bH/εc} of an ε-interval. Applying
an ε-rounding rule to the auction A yields an auction A′ obtained by applying all
ε-rounding actions in the rule, in arbitrary order, to A. I.e., given bids v1, . . . , vn,
for every bidder i the bid vi is changed to v
i
j where j is the index of the ε-interval
that contains the original bid vi. Each winning bidder pays her minimal winning
bid. Such an auction A′ is called an ε-rounding of A.
Remark 2.4. Any ε-rounding of any auction is ε-coarse.
2.3 Optimal Auctions
Our analysis makes very weak use of Myerson’s (1981) characterization of optimal single-
item auctions, which we therefore only present to the extent required by our analysis. (We
emphasize this weak use of Myerson’s characterization of optimal single-item auctions by
using the nonstandard term “Myersonian Auction.”)
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Definition 2.5 (Myersonian Auction, Myerson, 1981). An n-bidder Myersonian auction
(for valuations in [0, H]) is a tuple (φi)i∈N , where for every i ∈ N , φi : [0, H] → R is
a nondecreasing function called the ironed virtual valuation of bidder i. In this auction,
there is a winner unless φi(vi) < 0 for all i ∈ N , and the winner is the bidder with lowest
index among those whose bid vi maximizes φi(vi); the winner pays her minimal winning
bid.7
Myerson (1981) proved that for every continuous product distribution, there exists a
Myersonian auction that obtains the optimal revenue. Elkind (2007) showed the same for
discrete product distributions, giving an efficient algorithm for computing this optimal
auction.
Theorem 2.6 (Myerson, 1981). For every product distribution F = F1 × · · · × Fn, there
exists a Myersonian auction (φi)i∈N , denoted OPT (F ), that achieves maximum revenue
from F among all possible auctions. Moreover, for every i ∈ N , the ironed virtual
valuation φi depends only on Fi.
Theorem 2.7 (Elkind, 2007). Let t ∈ N. There exists an algorithm that runs in time
poly(t), such that given a discrete distribution Fˆi with support of size at most t, outputs a
nondecreasing function φi : supp Fˆi → R (so, φi is a nondecreasing sequence of at most t
real numbers), such that for every product Fˆ = Fˆ1 × · · · × Fˆn of discrete distributions
each having support of size at most t, the Myersonian auction (φi)i∈N (where φi is the
output of the algorithm given Fˆi) achieves maximum revenue from Fˆ among all possible
auctions.
Remark 2.8. The algorithm of Theorem 2.7 outputs an ironed virtual valuation φi
whose domain is supp Fˆi rather than [0, H]. To be completely formal and avoid any
ambiguities with regard to the definition of, e.g., the minimal winning bid of any bidder
(and later on, with regard to the revenue of this auction from distributions with support
larger than that of Fˆ ), we emphasize that whenever we consider (φi)i∈N as a Myerso-
nian auction, we do so by interpreting each φi as specifying only the “steps/jumps” in
the right-continuous step function that constitutes the ironed virtual valuation. That
is, we implicitly extend the definition of each such φi over all of [0, H] by defining
φi(vi) , Max
{
φi(wi)
∣∣ wi ≤ vi & φi(wi) is defined} for every vi, where this maximum
is defined to be −∞ (or any sufficiently small number) if it is taken over the empty set
(i.e., this is the level of the leftmost “plateau” of φi). In particular, we note that the
minimal winning bid of any bidder i in the Myersonian auction defined in Theorem 2.7
is always in supp Fˆi.
3 Rounding Arbitrary Auctions
In this section, we derive Lemma 1.2(a) from Section 1. In fact, we prove a stronger result
for arbitrary (not necessarily optimal) auctions. Fix an arbitrary auction A, fix ε > 0,
and fix a product distribution over valuation profiles F1 × · · · × Fn ∈ ∆
(
[0, H]
)n
. In this
section, we show that there exists an ε-rounding of A whose revenue from F1 × · · · × Fn
is less than an additive ε smaller than that of A.
7This auction can also be made symmetric, by choosing the winner uniformly at random between all
bidders whose bid vi maximizes φi(vi), and adapting the payments accordingly. The revenue is the same
either way. In this paper we use lexicographic ordering for simplicity.
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We note that in Example A.1 in Appendix A, we show that the desired ε-rounding A′
of A has to be constructed specifically for the target distribution F1× · · · ×Fn, i.e., that
in some scenarios, every ε-rounding of A must lose Ω(1) (i.e., at least some constant
independent of ε) revenue for some product distribution. We show this by showing that
in such scenarios, every ε-rounding of A must lose Ω(1) revenue for some valuation profile.
We show this even for the case where A is restricted to be the optimal auction for some
F1× · · · ×Fn, even when F1, . . . , Fn are regular8 distributions, even when the “rounded”
auction A′ may be any ε-coarse auction (whether or not an ε-rounding of A), and already
for n=2 bidders. In contrast, in Appendix C we show that for the special case in which A
is restricted to be the optimal auction for some i.i.d. product distribution F n = F×· · ·×F ,
it is always possible to construct an ε-rounding of A that loses less than an additive ε
over any valuation profile, and thus over any distribution, by simply rounding-down the
parameters representing the optimal auction.9 As shown in Appendix C, this implies a
simplified proof for the recent result of Roughgarden and Schrijvers (2016) for the i.i.d.
case, and highlights the difference between the general case considered here and the i.i.d.
case.
Our proof strategy for Lemma 1.2(a) is a probabilistic one: Given an auction A and
a target distribution F = F1× · · ·×Fn, we will construct a distribution over ε-roundings
of A that in expectation approximates the revenue of A from F , and hence deduce that
at least one (deterministic) auction in the support of this distribution does not lose much
revenue compared to A. We begin by defining this distribution over auctions, which
rounds the bids in each ε-interval to a value that is randomly picked according to the
restriction of the target distribution to that ε-interval.
Definition 3.1 (Conditional Distribution on an ε-Interval). For a distribution F ∈
∆
(
[0, H]
)
and an index j of an ε-interval, we denote the conditional distribution of
v ∼ F restricted to the ε-interval [j · ε, (j + 1) · ε) by F |j.10
Definition 3.2 (Randomized ε-Rounding). Let ε > 0.
• Let Fi ∈ ∆
(
[0, H]
)
. The Fi-randomized ε-rounding action on bidder i’s ε-interval j
is a distribution over ε-rounding actions (i, j, vij) obtained by randomly choosing
vij ∈
[
j · ε, (j + 1) · ε) according to the conditional distribution Fi|j of Fi restricted
to this ε-interval.11 Note that applying the Fi-randomized ε-rounding action to an
auction A yields a distribution over deterministic auctions A′.
• Let F = F1 × · · · × Fn ∈ ∆
(
[0, H]
)n
. The F -randomized ε-rounding rule is given
by the collection of Fi-randomized ε-rounding actions for all bidders i and all
ε-intervals j. Note that applying the F -randomized ε-rounding action to an auc-
tion A yields a distribution over deterministic ε-coarse auctions A′. This A′ is called
the F -randomized ε-rounding of A.
8Regularity is an assumption on distributions over valuations, which simplifies many analyses. We
do not elaborate on its definition, as we do not require it for our analysis beyond remarking that all
distributions in Example A.1 are regular.
9The construction underlying Example A.1 in Appendix A also demonstrates that for non-i.i.d. prod-
uct distributions, simply rounding-down all bids and applying the allocation rule of the optimal auction
to the rounded-down bids (while adapting the payments to ensure truthfulness, of course) may lose Ω(1)
in overall revenue. See Remark A.2 in Appendix A for more details.
10If this conditional distribution is ill defined, i.e., if F
(
[j · ε, (j + 1) · ε)) = 0, then we say that F |j is
not defined.
11If Fi|j is not defined, then we pick vij ∈
[
j · ε, (j + 1) · ε) arbitrarily, say, vij , j · ε.
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We start by analyzing the impact on the revenue from each bidder following the ap-
plication of a single Fi-randomized ε-rounding action to some given auction. This is done
in the following lemma, whose proof, once this lemma is stated, is quite straightforward
(but is nonetheless spelled out in Appendix B, to which all omitted proofs are relegated).
Lemma 3.3. Let F1 × · · · × Fn ∈ ∆
(
[0, H]
)n
, let A be an n-bidder auction, let ε > 0,
and let i ∈ N . Let j be an index of an ε-interval, and A′ be the result of applying the
Fi-randomized ε-rounding action on bidder i’s interval j to A. Let v−i ∈ [0, H]N\{i} be a
profile of valuations for all bidders other than i.
a. Let i′ ∈ N \ {i}.
i. For every vi /∈
[
j · ε, (j + 1) · ε), it is surely12 the case that
rA
′
i′ (v1, . . . , vn) = r
A
i′ (v1, . . . , vn).
ii. If Fi|j is defined, then
E
vi∼Fi|j
[
E
A′
rA
′
i′ (v1, . . . , vn)
]
= E
vi∼Fi|j
[
rAi′ (v1, . . . , vn)
]
.
b. Let wi be the minimal winning bid of i in A when all other bidders bid v−i.13
i. If wi /∈
(
j · ε, (j + 1) · ε),14 then for every vi ∈ [0, H], it is surely the case that
rA
′
i (v1, . . . , vn) = r
A
i (v1, . . . , vn).
ii. Assume that wi ∈
(
j · ε, (j + 1) · ε).14
1. For every vi /∈
[
j ·ε, (j+1) ·ε), it is surely the case that vi wins against v−i
in A′ if and only if vi wins against v−i in A.
2. If Fi|j is defined, then the winning probability of a bid vi ∼ Fi|j against v−i
is the same in A′ and in A (where in the former, the probability is taken
over the randomness of both vi and A
′, and in the latter — over the ran-
domness of vi).
3. Let w′i be the minimal winning bid of i in A
′ when all other bidders bid v−i
(so w′i is a random variable). It is surely the case that
|w′i − wi| < ε.
Lemma 3.3 implies the following theorem, which we believe to be of independent
interest.
Theorem 3.4. For every F = F1× · · ·×Fn ∈ ∆
(
[0, H]
)n
, for every n-bidder auction A,
and for every ε > 0, it is the case that∣∣∣E
A′
RevA
′
(F )− RevA(F )
∣∣∣ < p · ε,
12I.e., for every realization in the support of A′.
13The fact that A is a direct-revelation DSIC and ex-post IR auction implies that a winning bidder
pays her minimal winning bid, which is determined by v−i.
14This is indeed an open interval. There is no typo here.
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where A′ is the F -randomized ε-rounding of A, and where p is the probability that some
bidder wins in A when the profile of bids is distributed according to F .15
It is useful, though, not to merely consider Theorem 3.4 as a consequence of
Lemma 3.3, but to consider “intermediate results” between these two, both for instruc-
tive purposes (indeed, the deduction of Theorem 3.4 from Lemma 3.3 involves quite a
few summations), but also as these results are of independent value. For example, Theo-
rem 3.4 may be obtained by Lemma 3.3 by first considering the overall effect of a single
randomized rounding action on the overall expected revenue.
Lemma 3.5. Let F = F1×· · ·×Fn ∈ ∆
(
[0, H]
)n
, let A be an n-bidder auction, let ε > 0,
let i ∈ N , and let j be an index of an ε-interval. Then,∣∣∣E
A′
RevA
′ −RevA
∣∣∣ < ε · pij,
where A′ is the result of applying the Fi-randomized ε-rounding action on bidder i’s
ε-interval j to A, and where pij is the probability that i both wins and pays a price in(
j · ε, (j + 1) · ε) in A when the profile of bids is distributed according to F .
Lemma 3.5 will also be useful in Section 4. Another way to obtain Theorem 3.4
from Lemma 3.3 is to first consider the impact of the randomized rounding rule (i.e., all
randomized rounding actions together), albeit only on the revenue from a single bidder i
and only when her bid is restricted to some ε-interval.
Lemma 3.6. Let F = F1 × · · · × Fn ∈ ∆
(
[0, H]
)n
, let A be an n-bidder auction, and
let ε > 0. Let A′ be the F -randomized ε-rounding of A. For every i ∈ N and for every
index j of an ε-interval such that Fi|j is defined, it is the case that∣∣∣∣ Evi∼Fi|j
[
E
A′
rA
′
i (vi)− rAi (vi)
]∣∣∣∣ < ε · p,
where p is the probability that i wins in A when bidding vi ∼ Fi|j, when the remaining
bids are distributed according to F−i.16
Recall that we show in Example A.1 that an ε-coarse, deterministic valuation-by-
valuation approximation for A cannot exist for a product of general (even regular) non-
i.i.d. distributions. Lemma 3.6 precisely reveals the gap between the approximation
developed in this section and this (unattainable) goal: The approximation developed
in this section provides a randomized (rather than deterministic) approximation that
is amortized over each ε-interval of valuations (rather than attained on each valuation
profile separately). I.e., the difference between the revenues of A and of its F -randomized
ε-rounding from any bidder i, in expectation over vi ∼ Fi|j for any index j of an ε-interval,
is small.
Finally, by Theorem 3.4, at least one deterministic auction in the support of A′ loses
less than an additive p · ε ≤ ε in (overall) revenue compared to A, as formalized in
Proposition 3.7 below, which is a restatement of Lemma 1.2(a).
15In fact, a slightly stronger statement also holds, where p is replaced with the probability that some
bidder wins in A and pays a price that is not an integer multiple of ε when the profile of bids is distributed
according to F . See the proof of Theorem 3.4 for details. This implies, in a sense, that the revenue loss
due to ε-rounding is smaller if A already behaves similarly to an ε-coarse auction for a set of valuation
profiles that has positive probability.
16In fact, a slightly stronger statement also holds, where p is replaced with the probability that i wins
in A and pays a price that is not an integer multiple of ε when bidding vi ∼ Fi|j , when the remaining
bids are distributed according to F−i. See the proof of Lemma 3.6 for details.
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Proposition 3.7 (Restatement of Lemma 1.2(a)). For every product distribution F =
F1 × · · · × Fn ∈ ∆
(
[0, H]
)n
and for every auction A, there exists a (deterministic, ε-
coarse) ε-rounding A′ of A whose revenue from F is less than an additive ε smaller than
that of A.
Proof. Let A′ be the F -randomized ε-rounding of A. By Theorem 3.4, we have that
EA′ RevA
′
(F ) > RevA(F ) − ε. Therefore, at least one of the deterministic (ε-coarse,
ε-roundings of A) realizations of A′ has revenue greater than RevA(F )− ε.
We note that in Example A.3 in Appendix A, we show that the bound of “less than ε”
on the revenue difference in Lemma 1.2(a)/Proposition 3.7 (and hence also in Theo-
rem 3.4, etc.) cannot be unconditionally tightened any further, even when A′ may be any
ε-coarse auction (whether or not an ε-rounding of A), and already for n=1 bidder.
4 Efficiently Rounding Myersonian Auctions for
Empirical Distributions
In the previous section, we have seen that for any target distribution F = F1 × · · · × Fn,
the revenue-maximizing auction A can be ε-rounded into an ε-coarse auction A′ that
approximately maximizes the revenue from F . In this section, we derive Lemma 1.2(b)
from Section 1, showing how to deterministically and efficiently find a “good enough”
ε-rounding of A when for every i ∈ N , it is the case that Fi = Fˆi is a uniform distribution
over a multiset of t (sampled) values. (Recall that in such a scenario, the revenue-
maximizing auction A can be computed in polynomial time using Theorem 2.7.) First,
we note that if A is a Myersonian auction, then any rounding of A is also Myersonian,
and its ironed virtual valuations can be efficiently computed from those of A, given the
rounding actions.
Remark 4.1. Let A = (φi)i∈N be an n-bidder Myersonian auction and let ε > 0.
• Applying an ε-rounding action (i, j, vij) to A yields the Myersonian auction A′ ob-
tained by modifying φi to have the constant value φi(v
i
j) on the ε-interval
[
j ·ε, (j+
1) · ε).
• Applying an ε-rounding rule to A (recall that an ε-rounding rule is a collection of
ε-rounding actions (i, j, vij), one action for each pair of bidder i and index j of an
ε-interval) yields the Myersonian auction A′ obtained by modifying, for each bidder
i ∈ N , the function φi to be constant on each ε-interval, having the constant value
φi(v
i
j) on
[
j · ε, (j + 1) · ε) for each j.
• In particular, any ε-rounding of any Myersonian auction is also Myersonian (and
ε-coarse).
So, how do we find a “good enough” rounding of the optimal Myersonian auction A?
One option, which would lead to a randomized polynomial-time algorithm for finding
a suitable rounding with high probability, is to simply draw a polynomial number of
deterministic roundings from the F -randomized ε-rounding of A, and pick the one that
gives highest approximate (empirical) revenue among all drawn roundings, where the
(empirical) revenue from a given rounding can be estimated by drawing a polynomial
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number of valuation profiles from F and averaging the (empirical) revenue from the
given rounding over them. We next show that when for every i ∈ N , it is the case
that Fi = Fˆi is a uniform distribution over a multiset of t (sampled) values, this process
can be derandomized to yield an efficient deterministic algorithm that finds a suitable
rounding.17
We start with the question of deterministically computing the (empirical) revenue
RevA
′
(Fˆ ) of a given auction A′, where Fˆ = Fˆ1 × · · · × Fˆn. We note that in Example A.4
in Appendix A, we show that for general (even ε-coarse) auctions A′, this is a computa-
tionally hard problem, even when for every i it is the case that | supp Fˆi| = 2. (This indeed
motivates restricting our attention to Myersonian auctions in this section.) Nonetheless,
we now show that for a Myersonian auction A′, its empirical revenue may be precisely
computed in polynomial time. The key idea behind this result is that the revenue of
a Myersonian auction from a given valuation profile only depends on the two highest
ironed virtual bids; therefore, the algorithm efficiently calculates the overall revenue by
enumerating over all of the possibilities for these two bids.
Lemma 4.2. Let n, t ∈ N. There exists a deterministic algorithm that runs in time
poly(n, t), such that given n discrete distributions Fˆ1, . . . , Fˆn, each with support of size
at most t, and for each i ∈ N given a nondecreasing φi : supp Fˆi → R (so, φi is a
nondecreasing sequence of at most t real numbers), outputs the revenue Rev(φi)i∈N (Fˆ ) of
the Myersonian auction (φi)i∈N over the product distribution Fˆ = Fˆ1 × · · · × Fˆn.
Proof. The algorithm is as follows:
1. For every i ∈ N , for every j ∈ N \ {i}, and for every vj ∈ supp Fˆj:
(a) If j < i, then let Lij(vj) = Pvi∼Fˆi
(
φj(vj) ≥ φi(vi)
)
,
(b) If j > i, then let Lij(vj) = Pvi∼Fˆi
(
φj(vj) > φi(vi)
)
.
(So Lij(vj) is the probability that the value vj of j precedes the value of i.)
2. Initialize: r ← 0.
3. For every i ∈ N , for every j ∈ N \ {i}, and for every vj ∈ supp Fˆj:
(a) If i < j, then let wi ∈ Fˆi be the lowest such that φi(wi) ≥ φj(vj),
(b) If i > j, then let wi ∈ Fˆi be the lowest such that φi(wi) > φj(vj).
(So wi is the lowest value of i that precedes the value vj of j. Thus, wi is the
payment of i when both i wins and j is the second-highest bidder with bid vj.)
(c) Update: r ← r + wi ·
(
1− Lij(vj)
) · fˆj(vj) ·∏
k∈N\{i,j}
Lkj (vj).
(The added amount is the contribution to the expected revenue from valuation
profiles where i wins and j is the second-highest bidder with bid vj.)
4. Output: r.
17Another, in some sense less elegant, approach to derandomizing this algorithm would be to carefully
use the randomness inherent in the order of the t given samples. We indeed use such an approach later
when analyzing more general single-parameter auction environments in Section 6.3.
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We are now ready to present a deterministic algorithm that, given a Myersonian
auction A = (φi)i∈N that maximizes (empirical) revenue, finds an ε-rounding of A that
maximizes (empirical) revenue up to less than an additive nε. This algorithm sequentially
and greedily searches for the values vij for ε-rounding A, calculating the interim revenues
(following each rounding action) via the algorithm of Lemma 4.2, and bounding the
revenue loss via Lemma 3.5. From this algorithm, Lemma 1.2(b) follows.
Proposition 4.3. Let n, t ∈ N and let ε > 0. There exists a deterministic algorithm that
runs in time poly(H,n, 1/ε, t), such that given n discrete distributions Fˆ1, . . . , Fˆn, each
with support of size at most t, and for each i ∈ N given a nondecreasing φi : supp Fˆi → R
(so, φi is a nondecreasing sequence of at most t real numbers), outputs for every i ∈ N a
function φ′i, such that (φ
′
i)i∈N is an ε-rounding of (φi)i∈N , and such that
Rev(φ
′
i)i∈N (Fˆ ) > Rev(φi)i∈N (Fˆ )− nε,
where Fˆ = Fˆ1 × · · · × Fˆn.
Proof. The algorithm is as follows:
1. Initialize: φ′i ← φi for every i.
2. For every j ∈ {0, . . . , bH/εc}: initialize18 φ′i(j · ε)← Maxwi∈supp Fˆi∩[0,j·ε]{φi(wi)}.
3. For every i ∈ N :
(a) For every j ∈ {0, . . . , bH/εc}:
i. Let φ′′i ← φ′i.
ii. For every vij ∈ supp Fˆi ∩
[
j · ε, (j + 1) · ε):
A. Set φ′′i (vi)← φ′(vij) for every vi ∈
(
supp Fˆi∩
[
j ·ε, (j+1) ·ε))∪{j ·ε}.
(So φ′′ is the result of applying the ε-rounding action (i, j, vij) to φ
′.)
B. Compute rvij ← Rev(φ
′′
i ,φ
′
−i)(Fˆ ) via the algorithm of Lemma 4.2.
iii. For vij for which rvij is highest:
Update φ′i(vi)← φ′(vij) for every vi ∈
(
supp Fˆi∩
[
j ·ε, (j+1) ·ε))∪{j ·ε}.
(So φ′ is updated by applying the ε-rounding action (i, j, vij) that yields
the highest revenue for φ′ (after updating) among all ε-rounding actions
for bidder i’s ε-interval j.)
(Lemma 3.5 guarantees that the revenue loss is less than ε · pij for every pair (i, j),
and so less than ε · pi ≤ ε for every i, where pi is the probability that i wins,
for a total of less than nε over all bidders. Note that pij does not change during
our modification of φi at any ε-interval with index k 6= j; on the other hand,
the probabilities pi may well change during our modification of φi′ for i
′ 6= i, and
therefore our bound on the overall revenue loss is nε rather than ε as in the case of
randomized rounding studied in Section 3.)
4. Output: (φ′i)i∈N .
18See Remark 2.8.
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Recall that we have shown in Section 3 that there exists an ε-rounding of any given
Myersonian auction for any given target distribution, that loses less than an additive
ε in revenue. It is unclear to us whether one can bridge the gap between this (tight)
less-than-ε loss and the less-than-nε loss of Proposition 4.3 via an efficient deterministic
algorithm.
5 Uniform Convergence over the Set of
Rounded Myersonian Auctions
In this section, we conclude the derivation of Theorem 1.4 from Section 1. While most
previous analyses (Morgenstern and Roughgarden, 2015; Roughgarden and Schrijvers,
2016) restricted the set of possible “output auctions” to an infinite set and used ad-
vanced statistical tools to obtain that all auctions in this set perform similarly well on
the empirical distribution and on the true distribution, in this paper we restrict the set
of possible “output auctions” to a finite set, for which such a uniform-convergence result
may be shown via an elegant concentration inequality due to Babichenko et al. (2017)
(see also Devanur et al., 2016).
Definition 5.1 (Snε ). For every ε > 0, we denote the set of all ε-coarse Myersonian
n-bidder auctions (for valuations in [0, H]) by Snε .
Lemma 5.2.
∣∣Snε ∣∣ ≤ exp(poly(H,n, 1/ε)).
Proof.19 Let I ,
{
0, . . . , bH/εc}. We claim that every ε-coarse Myersonian auction A′ (for
valuations in [0, H]) is completely specified by a sequence
(
(i1, j1), (i2, j2), . . . , (iK , jK)
)
of
distinct pairs from N×I (so K ≤ |N | · |I|). The correspondence is as follows: Given such
a sequence, the allocation rule of the corresponding auction is specified by the following
algorithm:
1. If vi1 ≥ j1 · ε, then i1 wins; else, continue.
2. If vi2 ≥ j2 · ε, then i2 wins; else, continue.
...
K. If viK ≥ jK · ε, then iK wins; else, continue.
K+1. No bidder wins.
The winner (if any) pays her minimal winning bid.
Indeed, such a sequence may be constructed for any ε-coarse Myersonian auction A′ =
(φ′i)i∈N by taking all pairs (i, j) such that φ
′
i attains nonnegative value on the ε-interval
with index j, and sorting these pairs in decreasing order of this nonnegative value, break-
ing ties in favor of lower i, and for the same i in favor of higher j.20
19This proof is reminiscent of the way Devanur et al. (2016) bound the number of optimal auctions on
a finite valuation space.
20This results in a sequence with the additional property that for every k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} and for every
j ∈ {jk+1, . . . , bH/εc}, there exists ` < k such that i` = ik and j` = j. The above correspondence between
ε-coarse Myersonian auctions and sequences of bidder-index pairs, when the sequences are restricted to
have this additional property, is in fact one-to-one.
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By Lemma 5.2, we obtain the following corollary of Lemma 1.2(a)/Proposition 3.7,
which may be of independent interest.
Corollary 5.3. For every ε > 0, there exists a finite set of auctions Snε (of size at
most exp
(
poly(H,n, 1/ε)
)
), such that for every product distribution F = F1 × . . .× Fn ∈
∆
(
[0, H]
)n
there exists an auction A ∈ Snε that approximates the maximum possible rev-
enue from F up to less than an additive ε.
The exponential size of Snε means that if we can show for any given single auction that
the number of samples required for it to perform similarly well on the empirical distribu-
tion Fˆ and on the true distribution F is polynomial in H,n, and 1/ε, but has logarithmic
dependence on the desired success probability δ (as in the Chernoff-Hoeffding Inequality),
then a union bound over Snε can show that a polynomial number of samples suffices to
guarantee that with high probability all ε-coarse Myersonian auctions perform similarly
well on the empirical distribution Fˆ and on the true distribution F . Fortunately, an
elegant concentration inequality due to Babichenko et al. (2017) (see also Devanur et al.,
2016) shows precisely this (for any given single auction). The following proposition is a
special case of this concentration inequality. (See also Proposition C.10 in Appendix C for
an analogous yet somewhat more delicate concentration inequality for i.i.d. distributions,
which does not follow from the analysis of Babichenko et al., 2017 or of Devanur et al.,
2016.)
Proposition 5.4 (Follows from Babichenko et al., 2017; see also Devanur et al., 2016).
For every ε > 0 and δ > 0, there exists t = poly(H,n, 1/ε, log 1/δ) such that the following
holds. Fix F1, . . . , Fn ∈ ∆([0, H]) and fix an auction A. Draw t samples from each Fi,
and let Fˆi be the empirical uniform distribution over the t samples from Fi. Then, with
probability at least 1−δ it is the case that∣∣RevA(Fˆ )− RevA(F )∣∣ < ε,
where F = F1 × · · · × Fn and Fˆ = Fˆ1 × · · · × Fˆn.
For completeness, we provide in the appendix a short proof of Proposition 5.4 via the
Chernoff-Hoeffding Inequality and a union bound.
Remark 5.5. By the Chernoff-Hoeffding Inequality, when we draw t tuples
(v11, . . . , v
1
n), · · · , (vt1, . . . , vtn) from F , the empirical average value of the revenue of A
is concentrated around its expectation RevA(F ). This is not what Proposition 5.4
(and Babichenko et al., 2017 / Devanur et al., 2016) shows, since this shows that
Ej∼U({1,2,...,t}) rA(vj1, . . . , vjn) is close to RevA(F ), while Proposition 5.4 shows that
RevA(Fˆ ) = Ej1∼U({1,...,t}),··· ,jn∼U({1,...,t}) rA(v
j1
1 , . . . , v
jn
n ) is close to Rev
A(F ).
As noted above, the logarithmic dependence of t on 1/δ in Proposition 5.4, in con-
junction with the exponential size of Snε , allows us to use the union bound to obtain the
required uniform-convergence result over Snε .
Lemma 5.6. For every ε > 0 and δ > 0, there exists t = poly(H,n, 1/ε, log 1/δ) such that
the following holds. Fix F1, . . . , Fn ∈ ∆
(
[0, H]
)
, draw t samples from each Fi, and let
Fˆi be the empirical uniform distribution over the t samples from Fi. With probability at
least 1−δ, it is the case that ∣∣RevA(F )− RevA(Fˆ )∣∣ < ε
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holds simultaneously for every A ∈ Snε ∪
{
OPT (F )
}
, where F = F1 × · · · × Fn and
Fˆ = Fˆ1 × · · · × Fˆn.
Combining Lemma 5.6, Proposition 4.3, and Theorem 2.7, we obtain the following
theorem, providing a polynomial-time algorithm for learning an approximately optimal
auction from samples from an arbitrary unknown bounded product distribution.
Theorem 5.7 (Detailed version of Theorem 1.4). There exists t = poly(H,n, 1/ε, log 1/δ)
such that the following holds. Let F1, . . . , Fn be arbitrary distributions on [0, H]. For
every i ∈ N , draw t samples from Fi, and let Fˆi be the empirical distribution over the
t samples from Fi. Then, with probability at least 1−δ, the optimal auction for Fˆ =
Fˆ1×· · ·× Fˆn (which can be deterministically computed in time poly(t) via Theorem 2.7),
when ε
n+2
-rounded via the deterministic polynomial-time algorithm of Proposition 4.3,
approximates the maximum possible revenue from F = F1 × · · · × Fn up to less than an
additive ε.
Proof. Let t be as in Lemma 5.6, for Snε/(n+2). By Theorem 2.7 and Proposition 4.3, all
that we have to show is that the ε
n+2
-rounded auction A′ ∈ Snε/(n+2) that maximizes the
revenue from Fˆ up to less than an additive n · ε
n+2
also maximizes the revenue from F up
to less than an additive ε. By Lemma 5.6, by definition of A′, and by Lemma 5.6 again,
we have that
RevOPT (F )(F ) < RevOPT (F )(Fˆ ) + ε
n+2
≤
≤ RevOPT (Fˆ )(Fˆ ) + ε
n+2
<
< RevA
′
(Fˆ ) + (n+ 1) · ε
n+2
<
< RevA
′
(F ) + (n+ 2) · ε
n+2
=
= RevA
′
(F ) + ε,
as required.
6 Beyond Single-Item Auctions
In this section, we extend the single-item analysis of the previous sections to more general
single-parameter auction environments, deriving Theorem 1.5 from Section 1, as well as its
generalization for intractable single-parameter auction environments. A single-parameter
(auction) environment is defined by a set of possible outcomes X ⊆ [0, 1]n, where a
possible outcome (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X indicates that bidder 1 wins a fraction x1 ∈ [0, 1],
bidder 2 wins a fraction x2 ∈ [0, 1], etc. The maximum willingness of a bidder i with
valuation vi to pay for a fraction xi is xi · vi. The single-item environment is obtained as
a special case of single-parameter environment with
Xsingle-item =
{
(0, . . . , 0), (1, 0, . . . , 0), (0, 1, 0, . . . , 0), · · · , (0, . . . , 0, 1)}.
Additional important examples of single-parameter environments include matroid envi-
ronments (see, e.g. Hartline, 2016), where the possible sets of winners correspond to
independent sets in some matroid (N, I) over the ground set N of all bidders:
X(N,I) =
{
(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {0, 1}n
∣∣ {i ∈ N | xi = 1} ∈ I};
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and the (nonexcludable) public project environment (see, e.g. Hartline, 2016), where the
auctioneer chooses whether or not to produce a public project from which all bidders
benefit:
Xpublic-project =
{
(0, . . . , 0), (1, . . . , 1)
}
.
All of the above examples are special cases of deterministic environments, in which X ⊆
{0, 1}n, i.e., each bidder either wins a fraction 1 or loses. An important example of a
single-parameter environment that is not deterministic is that of position environments
(see, e.g., Hartline, 2016; see also sponsored search auctions in Roughgarden, 2016), where
n numbers x(1) ≥ · · · ≥ x(n) ∈ [0, 1] are given, and each possible outcome corresponds to
an ordering of the bidders, where the ith bidder in this order wins a fraction x(i).
6.1 Optimal Auctions
We once again make very weak use of Myerson’s (1981) characterization of optimal auc-
tions for single-parameter environments, and once again only present this characteriza-
tion, which generalizes that presented in Section 2, to the extent required by our analysis.
Definition 6.1 (Myersonian Auction for a Single-Parameter Environment, Myerson,
1981). An n-bidder single-parameter Myersonian auction
(
(φi)i∈N ; MAXX)
)
for the
single-parameter environment X ⊆ [0, 1]n (and valuations in [0, H]) has, for every i ∈ N ,
a nondecreasing function φi : [0, H] → R called the ironed virtual valuation of bidder i.
In this auction, the chosen outcome is (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X that maximizes the ironed virtual
welfare
∑n
i=1 xi ·φi(vi), where ties between maximizing outcomes are broken lexicograph-
ically;21 the payments are the unique22 nonnegative payments that make this auction
truthful for all valuation profiles in [0, H]n.
For arbitrary single-parameter environments, Myerson (1981) proves the following
generalization of Theorem 2.6.
Theorem 6.2 (Myerson, 1981). For every single-parameter environment X ⊆ [0, 1]n
and product distribution F = F1 × · · · × Fn, the Myersonian auction OPT (F ;X) =(
(φi)i∈N ; MAXX
)
, where for every i ∈ N the ironed virtual valuation φi is as in Theo-
rem 2.6 (and so depends only on Fi, and can be efficiently computed for discrete Fi as in
Theorem 2.7), achieves maximum revenue from F among all possible auctions for X.
The reader may verify that the Myersonian auction
(
(φi)i∈N ; MAXXsingle-item
)
coincides
with the Myersonian auction (φi)i∈N defined in Definition 2.5.
6.2 Rounding Arbitrary Auctions
Analysis similar to that of Section 3 can be used to prove the following generalization of
Theorem 3.4.
Theorem 6.3. For every F = F1 × · · · × Fn ∈ ∆
(
[0, H]
)n
, for every n-bidder auction A
for a single-parameter environment X ⊆ [0, 1]n, and for every ε > 0, it is the case that∣∣∣E
A′
RevA
′
(F )− RevA(F )
∣∣∣ < WA · ε,
21Once again, we use lexicographic tie breaking for simplicity.
22For details, see, e.g., Hartline (2016); Roughgarden (2016).
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where A′ is the F -randomized ε-rounding of A, and where WA , E(xi)
∑n
i=1 xi ≤ n, where
the expectation is over the outcome (xi)i∈N ∈ X of A when the profile of bids is distributed
according to F . (E.g., for a deterministic environment X ⊆ {0, 1}n, WA is the expected
number of winners in the outcome of A.)23
By Theorem 6.3, we obtain the following generalization of Proposition 3.7.
Proposition 6.4. For every product distribution F = F1 × · · · × Fn ∈ ∆
(
[0, H]
)n
and
for every auction A for a single-parameter environment X ⊆ [0, 1]n, there exists a (de-
terministic, ε-coarse) ε-rounding A′ of A whose revenue from F is less than an additive
WX · ε smaller than that of A, where WX , Max(xi)∈X
∑n
i=1 xi ≤ n. (E.g., for a de-
terministic environment X ⊆ {0, 1}n, WX is the maximum number of winners in any
outcome in X.)
6.3 Efficiently Rounding Myersonian Auctions for
Empirical Distributions
While the deterministic rounding algorithm of Proposition 4.3 can be adapted to certain
single-parameter environments beyond the single-item environment, such as matroid and
position environments, its complexity even for these two environments becomes exponen-
tial in the maximum number of winners. For this reason, we now consider a different
approach for efficiently searching for a revenue-approximating deterministic rounding of
a given Myersonian auction A, for a given target distribution F . Recall that in Section 4,
we sketched the following outline for a simple randomized polynomial-time algorithm for
finding, with high probability, a revenue-approximating ε-rounding of A: draw a polyno-
mial number of deterministic roundings from the F -randomized ε-rounding of A, and pick
the one that gives the highest approximate revenue among all drawn roundings, where the
revenue from a given rounding can be estimated by drawing a polynomial number of valu-
ation profiles from F and averaging the revenue from the given rounding over them. The
approach that we now present uses precisely this algorithm, however deterministically
obtains the necessary randomness from a polynomial number of samples that are drawn
from the true distribution of valuations, thus succeeding with high probability over the
drawn samples. Since our entire deterministic algorithm from Theorem 5.7/Theorem 1.4
is only guaranteed to succeed with high probability over samples drawn from the true
distribution of valuations, therefore utilizing a randomized algorithm to choose a suit-
able rounding of the empirical revenue-maximizing auction A in the above-described way
(deterministically obtaining the necessary randomness from samples drawn from the true
distribution) does not qualitatively change the nature of our overall result: a determinis-
tic algorithm that runs in polynomial time and, given polynomially many samples from
the true distribution, outputs a (deterministic) auction that approximately maximizes
revenue with high probability, where the high probability is over the randomness of the
given samples.
We start by formalizing the above randomized algorithm, to obtain an analogue of
Proposition 4.3, which on one hand generalizes Proposition 4.3 beyond single-item auc-
tions, but on the other hand trades determinism for randomization.
23In fact, as is the case for Theorem 3.4, a slightly stronger statement also holds, where WA is replaced
with, roughly speaking, the expectation over the sum of the fractions of the winnings whose threshold
prices are not integer multiples of ε. This implies here as well, in a similar sense, that the revenue loss
due to ε-rounding is smaller if A already behaves similarly to an ε-coarse auction for a set of valuation
profiles that has positive probability.
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Definition 6.5 (Tractable Single-Parameter Environment). We say that a single-
parameter environment X ⊆ [0, 1]n is tractable if there exists a deterministic algorithm
that runs in time poly(H,n), such that given the (realized) ironed virtual values φi(vi) of
all bidders, outputs the (lexicographically first) outcome (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X that maximizes
the ironed virtual welfare
∑n
i=1 xi · φi(vi).
Lemma 6.6. Fix a tractable single-parameter environment X ⊆ [0, 1]n. Let n, t ∈ N
and let ε > 0 and δ > 0. There exists a randomized algorithm that runs in time
poly(H,n, 1/ε, log 1/δ, t) and uses at most b = poly(H,n, 1/ε, log 1/δ, log t) random bits, such
that given n discrete distributions Fˆ1, . . . , Fˆn, each with support of size at most t, and for
each i ∈ N given a nondecreasing φi : supp Fˆi → R (so, φi is a nondecreasing sequence of
at most t real numbers), outputs for every i ∈ N a function φ′i : supp Fˆi → R, such that(
(φ′i)i∈N ; MAXX
)
is an ε-rounding of
(
(φi)i∈N ; MAXX
)
, and such that with probability at
least 1−δ it is the case that
Rev((φ
′
i)i∈N ;MAXX)(Fˆ ) > Rev((φi)i∈N ;MAXX)(Fˆ )− (WX + 1) · ε,
where Fˆ = Fˆ1 × · · · × Fˆn.
While for some (true) distributions F (with very low entropy), it is not possible
to extract b = poly(H,n, 1/ε, log 1/δ, log t) random bits from polynomially many random
samples from F , we now show that such distributions can be easily identified, and an
approximately optimal auction can easily be directly learned for them. We are therefore
able to derandomize the algorithm from Lemma 6.6 and obtain the following counterpart
for Proposition 4.3 for general tractable single-parameter environments.
Proposition 6.7. Fix a tractable single-parameter environment X ⊆ [0, 1]n. Let n, t ∈ N,
let ε > 0 and δ > 0. There exists s = poly(H,n, 1/ε, log 1/δ, t) ≥ t and a deterministic
algorithm that runs in time poly(H,n, 1/ε, log 1/δ, t), such that the following holds. Let
F1, . . . , Fn be arbitrary distributions on [0, H]. For every i ∈ N , draw s samples from Fi,
and let Fˆi be the empirical distribution over the first t of the s samples from Fi. The
algorithm, given the s samples drawn from F = F1 × · · · × Fn, and for each i ∈ N
given a nondecreasing φi : supp Fˆi → R (so, φi is a nondecreasing sequence of at most t
real numbers), outputs a bit e and for every i ∈ N a function φ′i, where if e = 1 then(
(φ′i)i∈N ; MAXX
)
is an ε-rounding of
(
(φi)i∈N ; MAXX
)
, such that with probability at least
1−δ, one of the following holds:
• e = 1 and Rev((φ′i)i∈N ;MAXX)(Fˆ ) > Rev((φi)i∈N ;MAXX)(Fˆ )− (WX + 1) · ε,
where Fˆ = Fˆ1 × · · · × Fˆn.
• e = 0 and Rev((φ′i)i∈N ;MAXX)(F ) > RevOPT (F ;X)(F )− ε.
6.4 Uniform Convergence over the Set of
Rounded Myersonian Auctions
Recall that in the single-item environment, we obtained a uniform convergence result
by noting that any ε-rounding of an optimal auction can be encoded by essentially only
encoding the relative order of all ironed virtual values φi(vi) for i ∈ N and vi ∈ supp Fˆi,
and also of 0. While such an encoding suffices for single-parameter environments where
the outcome that maximizes ironed virtual welfare can be found via a greedy-by-ironed-
virtual-value algorithm that at each step adds the next compatible bidder with maximum
19
nonnegative ironed virtual value φi(vi) to the set of winners, such as matroid and posi-
tion environments, this encoding is unsuitable for more general environments. Indeed,
already for the public project environment, knowledge of the order of all ironed virtual
values φi(vi) and 0 does not suffice in order to determine for a given valuation profile
(v1, . . . , vn) ∈ supp Fˆ whether the ironed virtual welfare
∑n
i=1 φi(vi) for the outcome
where all bidders win is greater than or less than 0, the ironed virtual welfare for the
outcome where no bidder wins. We now show that nonetheless, for any deterministic
environment (including the public project environment), if we encode every ε-rounding
of a Myersonian auction for this environment using the relative order of the ironed virtual
welfares for all possible outcomes and all valuation profiles, then the set of all possible
encodings still has size at most exp
(
poly(H,n, 1/ε)
)
, and so the analysis of Section 5 may
be used to obtain the required an appropriate uniform convergence result for arbitrary
deterministic environments.
Definition 6.8 (SXε ). For every ε > 0, we denote the set of all ε-coarse Myersonian
n-bidder auctions for a given single-parameter environment X ⊆ [0, 1]n by SXε .
Lemma 6.9. There exists e ≤ exp(poly(H,n, 1/ε)) such that ∣∣SXε ∣∣ ≤ e for every single-
parameter deterministic environment X ⊆ {0, 1}n.
Proof.24 Let
(
(φ′i)i∈N ; MAXX
)
be an ε-coarse Myersonian n-bidder auction for X. Let
M , n · (bH/εc + 1). We will show that for every i ∈ N , there exists a function ψ′i :
[0, H]→ R+ that is constant on each ε-interval and only attains values that are signed
rational numbers with nominator and denominator both having absolute value at most
M !, such that
(
(ψ′i)i∈N ; MAXX
)
=
(
(φ′i)i∈N ; MAXX
)
, i.e., these two Myersonian auctions
have the same outcome for every valuation profile. As this implies that
∣∣SXε ∣∣ ≤ (2 ·M !2 +
1)M ≤ exp(poly(H,n, 1/ε)), the lemma will follow.
For every i ∈ N and j ∈ {0, . . . , bH/εc}, let φ′i,j be the value that φ′i attains on
the ε-interval
[
j · ε, (j + 1) · ε). We will define the functions ψ′1, . . . , ψ′n by defining the
corresponding sequence of M values ψ′i,j via a set of linear constraints as follows: For
every j1, . . . , jn ∈
{
0, . . . , bH/εc} and for every two distinct subsets N1, N2 ⊆ N , we add
the following constraint:∑
i∈N1 ψ
′
i,ji
=
∑
i∈N2 ψ
′
i,ji
if
∑
i∈N1 φ
′
i,ji
=
∑
i∈N2 φ
′
i,ji
,∑
i∈N1 ψ
′
i,ji
≤∑i∈N2 ψ′i,ji − 1 if ∑i∈N1 φ′i,ji <∑i∈N2 φ′i,ji ,∑
i∈N1 ψ
′
i,ji
≥∑i∈N2 ψ′i,ji + 1 if ∑i∈N1 φ′i,ji >∑i∈N2 φ′i,ji .
We note that the set of constraints that we have defined is satisfiable. Indeed, setting
d , min
{∣∣∣∣∑
i∈N1
φ′i,ji −
∑
i∈N2
φ′i,ji
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ j1, . . . , jn ∈
{
0, . . . , bH/εc}
& N1, N2 ⊆ N &
∑
i∈N1
φ′i,ji 6=
∑
i∈N2
φ′i,ji
}
,
where by finiteness d>0, we note that the assignment ψ′i,j =
φ′i,j
d
for all i, j satisfies this
set of constraints. Since this set of (exponentially many) constraints in M unknowns
is satisfiable, there exists a solution defined by precisely M of these constraints, where
all M constraints are binding (i.e., hold with an equality rather than with an inequal-
ity). Let (ψ′i,j)i,j be this solution. By Cramer’s Rule, each ψ
′
i,j is the quotient of the
24This proof uses a technique in the spirit of the one popularly used to count weighted linear threshold
circuits. We are not aware of the use of any similar argument in the literature on mechanism design,
and hope that this type of argument may find additional uses in similar contexts in the future.
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determinants of two M ×M matrices, where in our case, by construction each of these
matrices contains only values in {−1, 0, 1}, and therefore, each such determinant is an
integer having absolute value at most M !. We conclude the proof as by construction,
for every valuation profile, the order of the ironed virtual welfares of every two possible
deterministic outcomes in {0, 1}n is the same according to both (φ′i)i∈N and (ψ′i)i∈N , and
therefore
(
(ψ′i)i∈N ; MAXX
)
=
(
(φ′i)i∈N ; MAXX
)
, as required.
Plugging in Theorem 6.2, Propositions 6.4 and 6.7, and Lemma 6.9 into the analysis
of the previous sections, we obtain the following analogue of Theorem 5.7, providing
a polynomial-time algorithm for learning an approximately optimal auction for a class
of single-parameter environments that includes deterministic environments (including
matroid environments and the public project environment) and position environments,
from samples from an arbitrary unknown bounded product distribution.
Theorem 6.10 (Detailed version of Theorem 1.5). Let X ⊆ [0, 1]n be a tractable deter-
ministic environment (such as a matroid environment or the public project environment)
or a position environment. There exist t ≤ s = poly(H,n, 1/ε, log 1/δ) such that the fol-
lowing holds. Let F1, . . . , Fn be arbitrary distributions on [0, H]. For every i ∈ N , draw
s samples from Fi, and let Fˆi be the empirical distribution over the first t of the s samples
from Fi. Then, with probability at least 1−δ, the auction output by the deterministic
polynomial-time “ ε
WX+3
-rounding” algorithm of Proposition 6.7 given the s samples from
F = F1 × · · · × Fn and given the optimal auction for Fˆ = Fˆ1 × · · · × Fˆn (which by Theo-
rem 6.2 can be deterministically computed in time poly(t) via Theorem 2.7), approximates
the maximum possible revenue from F up to less than an additive ε.
Remark 6.11. Theorem 6.10 also holds, via the same proof, for every tractable single-
parameter environment X ⊆ [0, 1]n such that ∣∣SXε ∣∣ ≤ exp(poly(H,n, 1/ε)).
6.5 Computationally Hard Auction Environments
Up until now, we have assumed that the given single-parameter environment X ⊆ [0, 1]n is
tractable. Nonetheless, for many single-parameter environments, including deterministic
environments, this is known not to be the case. We therefore now extend our analysis to
such environments.
A notable example of an intractable single-parameter environment is that of knapsack
environments (Mu’alem and Nisan, 2008; see also Roughgarden, 2016), where each bid-
der i has a nonnegative “size” wi, and a deterministic outcome is possible if the cumulative
size of all winners does not exceed some threshold w:
X(w1,...,wn;w) =
{
(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {0, 1}n
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
wi · xi ≤ w
}
.
In such environments, to precisely maximize ironed virtual welfare (and therefore rev-
enue), one must solve an instance of the well known KNAPSACK problem, which is
known to be NP-complete.
A popular approach in the literature for designing auctions for intractable environ-
ments X is to have the designed auction choose an outcome that approximately maxi-
mizes the ironed virtual welfare using some efficient constant-factor approximation algo-
rithm APPROXX instead of the intractable precise-maximization algorithm MAXX ; the
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payments are once again the unique nonnegative payments that ensure (precise) truth-
fulness25 for all valuation profiles in [0, H]n. We denote this auction, which by tools
developed by Myerson (1981) turns out to approximate the revenue from the optimal
auction OPT (F ;X) =
(
(φi)i∈N ; MAXX
)
up to the same constant multiplicative factor of
the approximation algorithm, by
(
(φi)i∈N ; APPROXX
)
.
Assume, therefore, that X ⊆ [0, 1]n is an intractable environment and that APPROXX
is a deterministic algorithm that runs in time poly(H,n), such that given the (realized)
ironed virtual values φi(vi) of all bidders, APPROXX outputs an outcome (x1, . . . , xn) ∈
X that maximizes the ironed virtual welfare
∑n
i=1 xi · φi(vi) up to some multiplicative
factor C > 1. We will explore when our analysis can be applied to yield a polynomial-
time algorithm for learning, from samples from an arbitrary unknown bounded product
distribution, a tractable auction that approximates the optimal revenue up to the same
multiplicative factor of C, plus less than an additive ε.
We start by noting that the analysis and results of Section 6.2 hold for all auctions,
and in particular also auctions of the form A =
(
(φi)i∈N ; APPROXX
)
. Furthermore, we
note that the analysis of Section 6.3 still holds when when replacing every occurrence of
MAXX with APPROXX and every occurrence of Rev
OPT (F ;X)(F ) with Rev
OPT (F ;X)(F )
C
.
Proposition 6.12. Proposition 6.7 still holds when every occurrence of MAXX is replaced
with APPROXX , when Rev
OPT (F ;X)(F ) is replaced with Rev
OPT (F ;X)(F )
C
, and when requiring
only that APPROXX runs in time poly(H,n) rather than requiring that X is tractable.
Let OPT (Fˆ ;X) =
(
(φi)i∈N ; MAXX
)
be the optimal auction for the empirical dis-
tribution Fˆ = Fˆ1 × · · · × Fˆn in the environment X. By assumption, the truthful
auction A =
(
(φi)i∈N ; APPROXX
)
approximates the optimal revenue from Fˆ up to a
multiplicative factor of C. By Proposition 6.12, there exists an efficient algorithm that
given (φi)i∈N and Fˆ (and given the ability to draw some additional samples from F ,
if the algorithm is to be deterministic rather than randomized), outputs an ε-rounding
A′ =
(
(φ′i)i∈N ; APPROXX
)
of A such that
RevA
′
(Fˆ ) > RevA(Fˆ )− (WX + 1) · ε ≥ Rev
OPT (Fˆ ;X)(Fˆ )
C
− (WX + 1) · ε.
Now, if we had a result analogous to Lemma 5.6, showing that with high probability, for
each ε-coarse auctions that uses APPROXX to maximize some ironed virtual welfare as
well as for OPT (F ;X), its revenues on F and on Fˆ differ by less than an additive ε,
then we would obtain the desired approximation result via a derivation similar to that of
Theorem 6.10 (and Theorem 5.7):
RevOPT (F ;X)(F ) < RevOPT (F ;X)(Fˆ ) + ε ≤
≤ RevOPT (Fˆ ;X)(Fˆ ) + ε <
< C · (RevA′(Fˆ ) + (WX + 1) · ε)+ ε <
< C · (RevA′(F ) + (WX + 2) · ε)+ ε =
= C · (RevA′(F ) + (WX + 2 + 1/C) · ε) ≤
≤ C · (RevA′(F ) + (WX + 3) · ε).
25For this auction to be truthful, the approximation algorithm must also maintain a certain well
understood monotonicity property. For details, see, e.g., Hartline (2016); Roughgarden (2016).
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While a first glance may suggest that Lemma 6.9 indeed gives the desired analogue of
Lemma 5.6, a closer look shows that more care is required here. Indeed, the fact that, as in
the proof of Lemma 6.9,
(
(ψ′i)i∈N ; MAXX
)
=
(
(φ′i)i∈N ; MAXX
)
by no means implies that(
(ψ′i)i∈N ; APPROXX
)
=
(
(φ′i)i∈N ; APPROXX
)
, as many approximation algorithms use
more information from (φ′i)i∈N beyond merely the order of all possible ironed virtual wel-
fares for all possible valuation profiles and outcomes. For instance, the 2-approximation
algorithm for the knapsack environment (Mu’alem and Nisan, 2008) also considers the
order of the quotients
(φ′i(vi)
wi
)
i∈N , which cannot be inferred from the order of all possi-
ble ironed virtual welfares alone. In the specific case of this 2-approximation algorithm,
this is not the end of the road since the set of all possible orders of these quotients is
of size at most exp
(
poly(H,n, 1/ε)
)
. More generally, we can obtain our approximation
result whenever, for every ε-coarse (φ′i)i∈N , we can encode all of the information that
APPROXX uses from (φ
′
i)i∈N , such that the set of all possible encodings (i.e., the set of
distinct ε-coarse auctions that use APPROXX to maximize some ironed virtual welfare)
is of size at most exp
(
poly(H,n, 1/ε)
)
. (This is the case, for example, if APPROXX only
reads the virtual valuations φ′i(vi) up to a precision of some polynomial number of bits.)
Definition 6.13 (SAPPROXXε ). For every ε > 0, we denote the set of all ε-coarse auctions
of the form
(
(φi)i∈N ; APPROXX
)
for a given approximation algorithm APPROXX for a
given single-parameter environment X ⊆ [0, 1]n by SAPPROXXε .
Theorem 6.14 (Generalization of Theorem 6.10/Theorem 1.5 for Intractable Auction
Environments). Let X ⊆ [0, 1]n be a single-parameter environment and let APPROXX
be a monotone algorithm that runs in time poly(H,n) and finds an outcome in X that
maximizes ironed virtual welfare up to some multiplicative factor C ≥ 1. If ∣∣SAPPROXXε ∣∣ ≤
exp
(
poly(H,n, 1/ε)
)
, then there exist t ≤ s = poly(H,n, 1/ε, log 1/δ) such that the follow-
ing holds. Let F1, . . . , Fn be arbitrary distributions on [0, H]. For every i ∈ N , draw
s samples from Fi, and let Fˆi be the empirical distribution over the first t of the s sam-
ples from Fi. Then, with probability at least 1−δ, the auction output by the deterministic
polynomial-time “ ε
WX+3
-rounding” algorithm of Proposition 6.12 given the s samples from
F = F1 × · · · × Fn and given
(
(φi)i∈N ; APPROXX
)
, for (φi)i∈N that can be deterministi-
cally computed in time poly(t) via Theorem 2.7 given Fˆ = Fˆ1 × · · · × Fˆn, approximates
the maximum possible revenue from F up to the same multiplicative factor of C, plus less
than an additive ε.
We note that Theorem 6.14 is a strict generalization of Theorem 6.10. Indeed, fixing
C = 1 in Theorem 6.14 yields Theorem 6.10, as a polynomial-time APPROXX that
guarantees revenue maximization “up to a multiplicative factor of 1” is precisely a
tractable MAXX .
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A Examples Omitted from the Main Text
Example A.1. FixH , 2. For every ε > 0, there exists a product of regular distributions
F = F1 × F2 ∈ ∆
(
[0, H]
)2
such that for every ε-coarse 2-bidder auction A′, there exists
a valuation profile (v1, v2) ∈ [0, H]2 such that rA′(v1, v2) < rOPT (v1, v2) − 1/13, where
OPT = OPT (F ) is the Myersonian auction that maximizes the revenue from F .
Indeed, let ε > 0 and assume without loss of generality that ε < 1/3 (otherwise, divide ε
by some large-enough integer). Let b1cε denote the largest integer multiple of ε that is
not greater than 1. Let F1 = U
(
[0, 2]
)
and let F2 ∈ ∆
([b1cε− ε, b1cε]) be the continuous
distribution with density function f2(x) = 2/ε2 ·
(
x− b1cε + ε
)
. By Theorem 2.6, OPT =
(φ1, φ2) for the (ironed) virtual valuations φ1, φ2 corresponding to F1, F2, respectively.
It is well known for the uniform distribution F1 that the corresponding (ironed) virtual
valuation satisfies φ1(v1) = 2 · v1 − 2 for every v1 ∈ [0, 2]. The crux of this example
is that F2 is defined so that despite the fact that it is tightly concentrated, the image
of the corresponding (ironed) virtual valuation φ2 is
(−∞, b1cε]. In particular, since
ε < 1/3, there exist v2, w2 ∈
[b1cε− ε, b1cε) such that φ2(v2) = 1/3 and φ2(w2) = 2/3. Note
that φ1(v1) = 1/2 for v1 = 5/4, and φ1(w1) = 1 for w1 = 3/2. Therefore r
OPT (v1, v2) = 7/6
(bidder 1 wins and pays her minimal winning bid of φ−11 (1/3) = 7/6) and r
OPT (w1, w2) = 4/3
(bidder 1 wins and pays her minimal winning bid φ−11 (2/3) = 4/3).
Let A′ be an ε-coarse 2-bidder auction. We will show that the proposition is satisfied
for either (v1, v2) or (w1, w2). Assume that r
A′(v1, v2) ≥ rOPT (v1, v2) − 1/13. Therefore,
we have that rA
′
(v1, v2) > 1. Since v2, w2 ∈
[b1cε − ε, b1cε), we therefore have that
rA
′
(v1, w2) = r
A′(v1, v2) > 1 as well. Therefore, for the valuation profile (v1, w2), the
winner is bidder 1 (since bidder 2 never pays more than her value). So, when bidder 2
bids w2, the minimal winning bid of bidder 1 is at most v1 = 5/4, and so bidder 1 does
not pay more than 5/4 if she wins against w2. Therefore,
rA
′
(w1, w2) ≤ 5/4 = 4/3− 1/12 = rOPT (w1, w2)− 1/12 < rOPT (w1, w2)− 1/13,
as claimed.
Remark A.2. The construction underlying Example A.1 also demonstrates that for
small enough ε > 0, there exists a product of regular distribution F = F1 × F2 ∈
∆
(
[0, H]
)2
such that if A′ is the auction obtained by simply rounding-down each bid to
the nearest integer multiple of ε and applying the allocation rule of OPT = OPT (F )
to the rounded-down bids (while adapting the payments to ensure truthfulness),26 then
RevA
′
(F ) < RevOPT (F )− 1/8.
Indeed, let ε > 0 and assume that ε < 1/4. For F = F1 × F2 as in Example A.1, the
“rounded-down” auction A′ is such that bidder 1 wins if and only if v1 ≥ d1eε, where d1eε
is the smallest integer multiple of ε that is not less than 1, and bidder 2 almost surely27
loses. Therefore, RevA
′
(F ) = 2−d1eε
2
· d1eε < 1/2 · (1 + ε). We lower-bound the revenue
26I.e., having each winning bidder pay her minimal winning bid.
27I.e., with probability 1.
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from OPT by considering an auction that sells to bidder 1 if v1 ≥ 3/2, and otherwise to
bidder 2. The revenue from this auction is 1/4 · 3/2+ 3/4 ·(b1cε−ε) > 9/8− 3/2 ·ε. Therefore,
RevOPT (F )− RevA′(F ) > 9/8− 3/2 · ε− 1/2 · (1 + ε) = 5/8− 2 · ε > 1/8,
as claimed.
Example A.3. For every H ≥ ε > 0 and ε > η > 0, there exists F ∈ ∆([0, H)) such that
for every ε-coarse 1-bidder auction A′, it is the case that RevA
′
(F ) ≤ RevOPT (F )(F )− η.
Indeed, let v , ε+η
2
> η > 0 and let p , η
v
∈ (0, 1). Let F ∈ ∆({0, v}) that assigns
probability p to the value v and probability 1− p to the value 0. Three truthful auctions
(allocation rules) exist for F :
1. the bidder always wins (and pays her minimal winning bid of 0),
2. the bidder wins only if she bids v (and pays her minimal winning bid of v),28 and
3. the bidder never wins.
The revenue (from F ) of the first and third auctions is 0, while the revenue of the second
auction is p · v = η > 0. Therefore, OPT (F ) is the second of these three auctions.
Note, however, that since {0, v} ∈ [0, ε), only the first and third auctions are ε-coarse, so
the revenue of any ε-coarse auction from F is 0, i.e., the loss in revenue of any ε-coarse
auction, compared to OPT (F ), is an additive η (and in particular, at least an additive η),
as claimed.
Example A.4. Let F1 = F2 = · · · = Fn = U
({0, 1}). For every w2, w3, . . . , wn ∈ N and
w ∈ N, we define the n-bidder (DSIC and ex-post IR) auction A′(w2, w3, . . . , wn;w) to be
the auction in which bidder 1 wins and pays 1 if and only if both v1 = 1 and
∑n
i=2wi ·vi =
w (otherwise, no bidder wins). Computing the revenue RevA
′(w2,...,wn;w)(F1 × · · · × Fn) is
#P-complete.
We first note that A′(w2, . . . , wn;w) is indeed DSIC and ex-post IR. Indeed, all bidders
except bidder 1 have utility 0 regardless of their reported bids, and so have no incentive
to misreport their values or to not participate. Furthermore, bidder 1 has utility 0 when
bidding 0 and when truthfully bidding 1, and utility ≤ 0 when untruthfully bidding 1.
Now, by definition, the revenue RevA
′(w2,...,wn;w)(F1 × · · · × Fn) equals half of the
probability that
∑n
i=2wi · vi = w for v2, v3, . . . , vn that are drawn independently and
uniformly from {0, 1}. This probability, in turn, equals exactly 2−(n−1) times the number
of subsets of {w2, . . . , wn} whose sum equals w. To compute the latter, one must solve
an instance of the counting analogue of the well known SUBSET-SUM problem, which
is known to be #P-complete.
B Proofs Omitted from the Main Text
B.1 Proofs for Section 3
Proof of Lemma 3.3. Assume without loss of generality that i = 1. We prove each part
separately.
28In fact, any payment in [0, v] can be charged in this case, but for our analysis we will be interested in
the auction of this form that achieves maximum revenue, and this auction charges v if the bidder wins.
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Proof of Part a(i): When v1 /∈
[
j · ε, (j + 1) · ε), the rounding of bids of bidder 1 in the
ε-interval with index j affects neither the determination of the winner, nor the minimal
winning bid (which equals the payment) of bidders other than bidder 1 (e.g., bidder i′),
as required.
Proof of Part a(ii):
E
v1∼F1|j
[
E
A′
rA
′
i′ (v1, . . . , vn)
]
= E
v1j∼F1|j
[
rAi′ (v
1
j , v2, v3, . . . , vn)
]
= E
v1∼F1|j
[
rAi′ (v1, v2, . . . , vn)
]
.
Proof of Part b(i): Assume that w1 /∈
(
j · ε, (j + 1) · ε). Therefore, the minimal winning
bid of bidder 1 in A′, regardless of the realization of v1j ∈
[
j · ε, (j + 1) · ε), remains w1,
and so for every v1 ∈ [0, H], we surely have that rA′1 (v1, . . . , vn) = rA1 (v1, . . . , vn).
Proof of Part b(ii)(1): We reason by cases. For every v1 < j · ε, we have, regardless of
the realization of v1j ∈
[
j · ε, (j+ 1) · ε), that bidder 1 loses against v−1 in both A′ and A.
For every v1 ≥ (j + 1) · ε, we have, regardless of the realization of v1j , that bidder 1 wins
against v−1 in both A′ and A.
Proof of Part b(ii)(2): The winning probability of a bid v1 ∼ F1|j in A is P(v1 ≥ w1) =
Pv1∼F1|j(v1 ≥ w1), and the winning probability of such a bid in A′ is P(v1j ≥ w1) =
Pv1j∼F1|j(v
1
j ≥ w1), i.e., the same probability, as required.
Proof of Part b(ii)(3): Since w1 ∈
(
j · ε, (j + 1) · ε), we have that the minimal winning
bid w′1 of bidder 1 in A
′ is surely either j ·ε or (j+1)·ε. Therefore, surely |w′1−w1| < ε.
Proof of Lemma 3.5. By Lemma 3.3(a) the only revenue that is affected by the change
from A to A′ is the revenue from bidder i, and by Lemma 3.3(b)(i), this revenue is affected
only when the minimal winning bid of bidder i lies in
(
j · ε, (j + 1) · ε), and even then,
by Lemma 3.3(b)(ii), this revenue is affected with the probability that bidder i wins, and
even then it is changed by less than an additive ε. So, the change in the overall revenue
is less than an additive ε · pij, as required.
Proof of Lemma 3.6. Assume without loss of generality that i = 1. Let A′′ be the result
of applying to A (in arbitrary order) all F1-randomized ε-rounding actions on all of
bidder 1’s ε-intervals. We start by noting that by Lemma 3.3(a),
E
v1∼F1|j
[
E
A′
rA
′
1 (v1)
]
= E
v1∼F1|j
[
E
A′′
rA
′′
1 (v1)
]
.
It therefore suffices to show that for every fixed v2, . . . , vn ∈ [0, H], it is the case that∣∣∣∣ Ev1∼F1|j
[
E
A′′
rA
′′
1 (v1, . . . , vn)
]
− E
v1∼F1|j
rA1 (v1, . . . , vn)
∣∣∣∣ < ε · Pv1∼F1|j[1 wins in A against v−1].
Let w1 be the minimal winning bid of bidder 1 in A when the other bidders bid v2, . . . , vn.
Let k be such that w1 ∈
[
k · ε, (k + 1) · ε), and let A′′′ be the result of applying the
F1-randomized ε-rounding action on bidder 1’s ε-interval k to A. By thinking of A
′′ as
having been constructed from A by first applying the randomized rounding action for k
to yield A′′′ (following which, the minimal winning bid of bidder 1 surely becomes either
k · ε or (k + 1) · ε) and then applying all randomized rounding actions for intervals other
than k, we obtain by Lemma 3.3(b)(i) that
E
v1∼F1|j
[
E
A′′
rA
′′
1 (v1, . . . , vn)
]
= E
v1∼F1|j
[
E
A′′′
rA
′′′
1 (v1, . . . , vn)
]
.
27
We conclude the proof as by Lemma 3.3(b)(ii) we obtain that∣∣∣∣ Ev1∼F1|j
[
E
A′′′
rA
′′′
1 (v1, . . . , vn)
]
− E
v1∼F1|j
rA1 (v1, . . . , vn)
∣∣∣∣ < ε · Pv1∼F1|j[1 wins in A against v−1].
(We note that when w1 = k · ε, Lemma 3.3(b)(i) implies that there is surely no
difference between the two revenues above, and so Lemma 3.6 can in fact be slightly
strengthened, by replacing p in the statement of this lemma with the probability that i
wins in A and pays a price that is not an integer multiple of ε when bidding vi ∼ Fi|j,
when the remaining bids are distributed according to F−i.)
Proof of Theorem 3.4. By the triangle inequality and by Lemma 3.6,∣∣∣E
A′
RevA
′
(F )− RevA(F )
∣∣∣ ≤ n∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣ Evi∼Fi [EA′ rA′i (vi)− rAi (vi)]
∣∣∣∣ < n∑
i=1
ε · P
F
[i wins] = p · ε,
as required.
Alternatively, we may prove the result via Lemma 3.5: We start with A and gradually
apply, for all i and j, the Fi-randomized ε-rounding action on bidder i’s interval j, to
obtain A′. By Lemma 3.5, when the randomized rounding action for a pair (i, j) is applied,
the revenue changes by less than an additive pij ·ε, and so less than an additive ε·PF [i wins]
for all randomized rounding actions for each bidder i, for a total of less than an additive
p · ε for the entire randomized rounding rule. (Note that pij, in expectation over all
randomized rounding actions already applied to bidders other than i, does not change
during the application of the randomized rounding action for any bidder-index pair other
than (i, j).)
(We note that regardless of whether we prove Theorem 3.4 via Lemma 3.5 or via
Lemma 3.6,29 Theorem 3.4 can in fact be slightly strengthened, by replacing p in the
statement of this theorem with the probability that some bidder wins in A and pays a
price that is not an integer multiple of ε when the profile of bids is distributed according
to F .)
B.2 Proofs for Section 5
Proof of Proposition 5.4. We will show that with probability at least 1−δ, it is the case
that
∣∣EFˆ r−EF r∣∣ < ε for any fixed random variable r : [0, H]n → [0, H]. The proposition
will follow by setting r , rA.
Let (v11, . . . , v
1
n), . . . , (v
t
1, . . . , v
t
n) be t independently drawn random tuples sampled
from F . Let k1 , 1 and for every i ∈ {2, 3, . . . , n}, fix ki ∈ {1, . . . , t}. We note
that (vk1+j1 , . . . , v
kn+j
n ) for j = 1, . . . , t (where addition of ki and j wraps around from
t to 1) are t independent random samples from F1 × · · · × Fn = F . Therefore, letting
rk2,...,kn , 1t
∑t
j=1 r(v
k1+j
1 , . . . , v
kn+j
n ), we have by the Chernoff-Hoeffding Inequality that
P
(∣∣rk2,...,kn − E
F
r
∣∣ ≥ ε) ≤ 2 exp(−2tε2
H2
)
.
Noting that by definition EFˆ r =
1
tn−1
∑
k2,...,kn∈{1,...,t} rk2,...,kn , taking the union bound, we
have that
P
(∣∣Eˆ
F
r − E
F
r
∣∣ ≥ ε) ≤ tn−1 · 2 exp(−2tε2
H2
)
.
29For the latter, by the note concluding its proof.
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We conclude the proof as there exists t = poly(H,n, 1/ε, log 1/δ) such that
tn−1 · 2 exp
(
−2tε
2
H2
)
≤ δ.
Proof of Lemma 5.6. Let δ′ , δ|Snε |+1 . By Lemma 5.2,
∣∣Snε ∣∣ ≤ exp(poly(H,n, 1/ε)). There-
fore, by Proposition 5.4 there exists t = poly(H,n, 1/ε, log 1/δ′) = poly(H,n, 1/ε, log 1/δ)
such that for every A ∈ Snε ∪ {OPT (F )} separately, with probability at least 1 − δ′, we
have that ∣∣RevA(F )− RevA(Fˆ )∣∣ < ε.
By the union bound, we therefore have that with probability at least 1− (|Snε |+ 1) · δ′ =
1− δ, this holds for all auctions A ∈ Snε ∪
{
OPT (F )
}
simultaneously, as required.
B.3 Proofs for Section 6
Proof sketch of Theorem 6.3. Similar to the proof of Theorem 3.4. Roughly speaking,
instead of having a revenue change of less than ε whenever bidder i wins and her minimal
winning bid is inside the open ε-interval to which the rounding action is applied (as in
Lemma 3.3), it is the case that if f is the fraction of the winnings of bidder i whose
threshold prices are inside this ε-interval, then the revenue change is less than f ′ · ε,
where f ′ is the “part of f” that i wins.
Proof of Proposition 6.4. Analogous to the proof of Proposition 3.7, with Theorem 3.4
replaced with Theorem 6.3.
Proof of Lemma 6.6. Let A ,
(
(φi)i∈N ; MAXX
)
. The algorithm is as follows, for D,E =
poly(H, 1/ε, log 1/δ) that we define below:
1. For every e ∈ {1, . . . , E}:
• Draw a valuation profile (ve1, . . . , ven) ∼ Fˆ .
2. For every d ∈ {1, . . . , D}:
(a) Draw a (deterministic) ε-rounding rule from (the distribution specified by) the
Fˆ -randomized ε-rounding rule.
(b) Apply this ε-rounding rule to A to obtain an (ε-coarse) auction A′d.
(c) Initialize rd ← 0.
(d) For every e ∈ {1, . . . , E}:
• Update30 rd ← rd + r
A′d (ve1,...,v
e
n)
E
.
3. Output (the ironed virtual valuations of) the auction A′d for d = arg Maxd∈{1,...,D} rd.
30The explicit formula of Myerson (1981) for the (truthful) payments in a Myersonian auction yields
that given an ε-coarse Myersonian auction A for a tractable single-parameter environment, and given a
valuation profile (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ supp Fˆ , it is possible in our setting to deterministically compute not only
the allocation of A in time poly(H,n), but also the associated payments in time poly(H,n, t).
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We now choose D and E. We would like to choose D such that with high probability,
at least one of the drawn auctions A′d has revenue not significantly lower than the expected
revenue of the Fˆ -randomized ε-rounding of A, which we denote by A′. More accurately,
we would like D to satisfy the following:
P
(
1
D
D∑
d=1
RevA
′
d(Fˆ ) ≤ E
A′
RevA
′
(Fˆ )− ε/3
)
≤ δ
2
. (1)
By the Chernoff-Hoeffding Inequality, we have that
P
(
1
D
D∑
d=1
RevA
′
d(Fˆ ) ≤ E
A′
RevA
′
(Fˆ )− ε/3
)
≤ exp
(
−2Dε
2
9H2
)
.
Therefore, by choosing D , 9H2
2ε2
log 2
δ
= poly(H, 1/ε, log 1/δ), we have that Eq. (1) is
satisfied.
We would now like to choose E such that with high probability, the estimated rev-
enue rd for each A
′
d is close to the true revenue of A
′
d from Fˆ . More accurately, we would
like E to satisfy the following, for every d ∈ {1, . . . , D}:
P
(∣∣rd − RevA′d(Fˆ )∣∣ ≥ ε/3) ≤ δ
2D
. (2)
By the Chernoff-Hoeffding Inequality, we have that
P
(∣∣rd − RevA′d(Fˆ )∣∣ ≥ ε/3) ≤ 2 exp(−2Eε2
9H2
)
.
Therefore, by choosing E , 9H2
2ε2
log 4D
δ
= poly(H, 1/ε, log 1/δ), we have that Eq. (2) is
satisfied for every d ∈ {1, . . . , D}.
Having chosen D and E, we now prove the correctness of the algorithm. By taking
the union bound over Eq. (1) and over Eq. (2) for all d ∈ {1, . . . , D}, we obtain that with
probability at least 1− δ, both of the following hold:
• For every d ∈ {1, . . . , D} it is the case that ∣∣rd − RevA′d(Fˆ )∣∣ < ε/3, and
• There exists d′ ∈ {1, . . . , D} such that RevA′d′ (Fˆ ) > EA′ RevA′(Fˆ )− ε/3.
Let d ∈ {1, . . . , D} be such that rd is highest (so the algorithm outputs A′d). In particular,
rd ≥ rd′ . Therefore,
RevA
′
d(Fˆ ) > rd − ε/3 ≥ rd′ − ε/3 > RevA′d′ (Fˆ )− 2 · ε/3 >
> E
A′
RevA
′
(Fˆ )− 3 · ε/3 = E
A′
RevA
′
(Fˆ )− ε > RevA(Fˆ )− (WX + 1) · ε,
where the last inequality is by Theorem 6.3.
Finally, we estimate the number of random bits used by the algorithm. To draw E val-
uation profiles, the algorithm requires O(E · n · log t) random bits. To draw D roundings
of A′, the algorithm requires O
(
D · n · H/ε · log t) random bits. Therefore, in total the
algorithm uses at most poly(H,n, 1/ε, log 1/δ, log t) random bits, as required.
Proof of Proposition 6.7. Let b be as in Lemma 6.6 for (the given) t and ε, and for
guaranteeing success with probability at least 1− δ/2. We start by finding a probability η
such that both of the following hold:
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• On the one hand, if for every i ∈ N the distribution Fi has an atom vi ∈ [0, H] with
probability Fi(vi) ≥ 1−η, then the auction that extracts the entire social welfare of
the outcome that maximizes the social welfare for (v1, . . . , vn), maximizes the overall
revenue from F up to an additive ε. Furthermore, in this case with probability at
least 1−δ each such atom vi can be recovered by taking the most common sample
value out of sv = poly(log n, log 1/δ) (chosen below) independent samples from Fi.
• On the other hand, if the above does not hold (i.e., if there exists i ∈ N such that
for every vi ∈ [0, H] it is the case that Fi(vi) < 1−η), then one can with probability
at least 1−δ/2 extract b random bits from sb = poly(H,n, 1/ε, log 1/δ, log t) (chosen
below) independent pairs of (independent) samples from F .
Assume first that for every i ∈ N there exists vi ∈ [0, H] such that Fi(vi) ≥ 1 − η.
Taking the union bound, we have that F (v1, . . . , vn) ≥ 1− nη. For every i ∈ N , let
φ′i(v
′
i) ,
{
vi v
′
i ≥ vi,
−∞ v′i < vi.
(3)
We note that
r((φ
′
i)i∈N ;MAXX)(v1, . . . , vn) =
n∑
i=1
xi · vi ≥ rOPT (F ;X)(v1, . . . , vn), (4)
where (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X is the outcome that maximizes the social welfare
∑n
i=1 xi · vi for
(v1, . . . , vn). (The inequality in Eq. (4) holds as the revenue can never exceed the social
welfare.) Therefore, by definition of (v1, . . . , vn) we have that
Rev((φ
′
i)i∈N ;MAXX)(F ) ≥ RevOPT (F ;X)(F )− nηH.
Therefore, choosing any η < ε
nH
, we obtain that if for every i ∈ N there exists vi ∈ [0, H]
such that Fi(vi) ≥ 1 − η, then Rev((φ′i)i∈N ;MAXX)(F ) > RevOPT (F ;X)(F ) − ε, for (φ′i)i∈N
as defined in Eq. (3). We choose η , ε
(n+3)H
< ε
nH
as this also conveniently guarantees
that η ≤ 1/4, which we will use later. (If ε ≥ H, then any revenue is at most ε and the
proposition is trivially satisfied.)
Still under the assumption that for every i ∈ N there exists vi ∈ [0, H] such that
Fi(vi) ≥ 1− η, let freqvi be (a random variable that equals) the fraction of samples that
equal vi out of sv independent samples from Fi. Recall that η ≤ 1/4. By the Chernoff-
Hoeffding Inequality, we have that
P
(
freqvi ≤ 1/2) ≤ P
(
freqvi ≤ 1− η − 1/4
)
≤ exp
(
−sv
8
)
,
and so taking sv , d8 log n/δe = poly(log n, log 1/δ) guarantees that P
(
freqvi >
1/2) ≥
1 − δ/n, and by the union bound we have that with probability at least 1 − δ, for every
i ∈ N the most common sample value out of sv independent samples from Fi is vi.
Assume now that there exists i ∈ N such that for every vi ∈ [0, H] it is the case
that Fi(vi) < 1 − η. We now show that there exists sb = poly(H,n, 1/ε, log 1/δ, t, b) such
that with probability at least 1 − δ/2, from sb independent pairs of samples from Fi,
at least b pairs are of two nonidentical samples. Since for every vi ∈ [0, H] it is the
case that Fi(vi) < 1 − η, there exists a partition of [0, H] into two disjoint sets V,W
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such that Fi(V ) < 1 − η and Fi(W ) < 1 − η. As we will choose sb , s′ · b, by the
union bound we upper bound the probability that from s independent pairs of samples
from Fi less than b pairs are of two nonidentical samples, by b times the probability that
s′ independent pairs of samples from Fi are all of identical samples. We upper bound the
latter probability by the probability that 2s′ independent samples from Fi lie entirely in
one of the sets V,W , which is less than 2(1− η)2s′ . Choosing the smallest integer s′ such
that 2(1− η)2s′ ≤ δ
2b
therefore guarantees that the probability that from sb independent
pairs of samples from F less than b pairs are of two nonidentical samples, is at most δ/2.
It therefore remains to estimate s′ (and hence sb). By definition, s′ is the smallest integer
such that 2s′ · log(1− η) ≤ log δ
4b
, and so
s′ =
⌈
log δ
4b
2 log(1− η)
⌉
≤
⌈
log δ
4b
−2η
⌉
=
⌈
log 4b
δ
2η
⌉
=
⌈
log(4b) + log 1/δ
2η
⌉
=
=
⌈
(n+ 3)H · (log(4b) + log 1/δ)
2ε
⌉
= poly(H,n, 1/ε, log 1/δ, log b),
and so sb = s
′ · b = poly(H,n, 1/ε, log 1/δ, log t).
We are now ready to present the deterministic “ε-rounding” algorithm. Let s ,
Max{2sb, sv, t} = poly(H,n, 1/ε, log 1/δ, t). The algorithm is as follows:
1. Split the given s samples from F into bs/2c pairs of samples.
2. If less than b of the pairs are of two nonidentical samples:
(a) For each i ∈ N , let vi be the most common out of the ith-coordinate values of
the s samples.
(b) Output e = 0 and the functions (φ′i)i∈N where for every i, φ
′
i is defined only
for vi, with φ
′
i(vi) , vi.31
3. Else:
(a) From each of the first b of the pairs of samples that are of two nonidentical
samples, compute a single (random) bit as follows: let i be the first index such
that the ith coordinates of these two samples differ; the desired (random) bit
is 1 if the ith coordinate of the first sample is smaller than the ith coordinate
of the second sample, and 0 otherwise.
(b) Deterministically run the algorithm from Lemma 6.6 on (φi)i∈N using the b
(random) bits computed above instead of the (at most) b random bits required
by the algorithm.
(c) Output e = 1 and the functions (φ′i)i∈N that were output by the algorithm
from Lemma 6.6 when run in Step 3(b).
We start by noting that if the above algorithm outputs e = 1, then by Lemma 6.6,(
(φ′i)i∈N ; MAXX
)
is an ε-rounding of
(
(φi)i∈N ; MAXX
)
. To prove that the algorithm is
correct with probability at least 1− δ, we first note that the algorithm can terminate in
precisely one of two ways:
31Recall that by Remark 2.8, as an ironed virtual valuation we interpret this φ′i as coinciding with φ
′
i
as defined in Eq. (3).
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1. In Step 2(b), since less than b of the bs/2c pairs of samples are of two nonidentical
samples.
2. In Step 3(c), since at least b of the bs/2c pairs of samples are of two nonidentical
samples.
If the algorithm terminates in Step 3(c), then since the b bits computed in Step 3(a) are
indeed random and independent (von Neumann, 1951), and so Lemma 6.6 guarantees
that with probability at least 1− δ/2, we have
Rev((φ
′
i)i∈N ;MAXX)(Fˆ ) > Rev((φi)i∈N ;MAXX)(Fˆ )− (WX + 1) · ε,
and therefore if the algorithm terminates in Step 3(c), then it succeeds with at least
this probability. To complete the proof of correctness, we reason by cases, according to
whether or not for every i ∈ N there exists vi ∈ [0, H] such that Fi(vi) ≥ 1− η.
We start by analyzing the case in which for every i ∈ N there exists vi ∈ [0, H] such
that Fi(vi) ≥ 1− η. In this case, if the algorithm terminates in Step 2(b), then as shown
above, with probability at least 1− δ we correctly identify vi using s ≥ sv samples, and
so e = 0 and (as shown above) Rev((φ
′
i)i∈N ;MAXX)(F ) > RevOPT (F ;X)(F )− ε, as required.
So, regardless of whether the algorithm terminates in Step 2(b) or in Step 3(c), with
probability at least 1− δ the algorithm succeeds, as required.
It remains to analyze the case in which there exists i ∈ N such that for every vi ∈ [0, H]
it is the case that Fi(vi) < 1− η. In this case, as shown above, the probability that less
than b of the bs/2c ≥ sb pairs of samples have two nonidentical ith coordinate-values is at
most δ/2. Therefore, with probability at least 1−δ/2 the algorithm terminates in Step 3(c),
and as shown above, if this happens, then with probability at least 1− δ/2, the algorithm
succeeds. Therefore, taking the union bound, in this case with probability at least 1− δ
we have that e = 1 and Rev((φ
′
i)i∈N ;MAXX)(Fˆ ) > Rev((φi)i∈N ;MAXX)(Fˆ ) − (WX + 1) · ε, as
required.
Proof of Theorem 6.10. The proof is analogous to that of Theorem 5.7. An analogous
version of Lemma 5.6 can be proven for SXε rather than S
n
ε via an analogous proof, replac-
ing Lemma 5.2 with the assumption that
∣∣SXε ∣∣ ≤ exp(poly(H,n, 1/ε)). (For position and
matroid environments, no replacement is needed, and for arbitrary deterministic environ-
ments the assumption holds by Lemma 6.9.) Let t be as in this analogue of Lemma 5.6
for SXε/(WX+3), for guaranteeing success with probability at least 1 − δ/2. Let s be as in
Proposition 6.7 for guaranteeing success with probability at least 1− δ/2. By Theorem 2.7
and Proposition 6.7 (and by taking a union bound over two failure probabilities of at
most δ/2 each), all that we have to show is that if the algorithm of Proposition 6.7 out-
puts e = 1 and an ε
WX+3
-rounded auction A′ ∈ Snε/(WX+3) that maximizes the revenue
from Fˆ up to less than an additive (WX + 1) · εWX+3 , then this auction also maximizes the
revenue from F up to less than an additive ε. Showing this is analogous to the conclusion
of the proof of Theorem 5.7.
Proof of Proposition 6.12. Analogous to the proof of Proposition 6.7 and Lemma 6.6,
replacing every occurrence of MAXX with APPROXX , replacing every occurrence of
RevOPT (F ;X)(F ) with Rev
OPT (F ;X)(F )
C
, and with Eq. (4) becoming
r((φ
′
i)i∈N ;APPROXX)(v1, . . . , vn) =
n∑
i=1
xi · vi ≥ r
OPT (F ;X)(v1, . . . , vn)
C
,
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where (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X is the outcome that APPROXX outputs given (v1, . . . , vn), which
maximizes the social welfare
∑n
i=1 xi · vi for (v1, . . . , vn) up to a multiplicative factor
of C.
Proof of Theorem 6.14. Analogous (see Section 6.5 for details) to the proof of Theo-
rem 6.10, with SXε/(WX+3) replaced with S
APPROXX
ε/(WX+3)
, and with Proposition 6.7 replaced
with Proposition 6.12.
C Simple Efficient Empirical Revenue Maximization
for I.I.D. Bidders
Possibly the most na¨ıve way to construct a small set of auctions is to consider only
auctions for which all of the parameters of the auction are specified with some fixed
precision, and to learn an auction from this set for some empirical distribution by com-
puting the optimal auction for that distribution, and then rounding its parameters to
obtain an auction from this set. The best possible hope in this case would be that on
each valuation profile for the bidders, the rounded auction loses less than an additive ε
in revenue. While, as shown in Example A.1 in Appendix A, such an approach turns
out too good to be true in the general case of non-i.i.d. product distributions, in this
appendix we show that remarkably, this approach succeeds for arbitrary (even irregular)
i.i.d. product distributions, reproving the existence of a polynomial-time learning algo-
rithm from Roughgarden and Schrijvers (2016) via a considerably simpler argument and
a more natural (albeit not dissimilar) algorithm, and highlighting the difference between
the general case considered in the main text and the i.i.d. case.
C.1 Optimal Auctions
We once again make very weak use of Myerson’s (1981) characterization of optimal auc-
tions for i.i.d. product distributions, and once again only present this characterization,
which is a special case of that presented in Section 2, to the extent required by our
analysis.
Definition C.1 (Second-Price Auction with Reserve Price and Ironed Intervals, Myerson,
1981). A second-price auction with reserve price and ironed intervals is a pair (p, I), where
p ∈ [0, H] is called the reserve price, and I ⊆ {[`, h) ∣∣ p ≤ ` < h ≤ H} are (possibly
infinitely many) pairwise-disjoint intervals called ironed intervals. In this auction, there
is a winner unless all bidders bid below the reserve price, and the winner is the bidder
with lowest index among those with the highest bid, unless the highest bid lies in the
same ironed interval as lower bids, in which case the winner is the bidder with lowest
index among those whose bid lies in this ironed interval; the winner pays her minimal
winning bid.32
Myerson (1981) proved that for every continuous i.i.d. product distribution, there
exists a second-price auction with reserve price and ironed intervals that obtains the
32Once again, this auction can also be made symmetric, by choosing the winner uniformly at random
among all bidders with highest bid / whose bids lie in the same ironed interval as the highest bid, and
adapting the payments accordingly. The revenue is the same either way. As noted above, in this paper
we use lexicographic ordering for simplicity.
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optimal revenue. Elkind (2007) showed the same for discrete i.i.d. product distributions,
giving an efficient algorithm for computing this optimal auction. These results are special
cases of Theorems 2.6 and 2.7, respectively.
Theorem C.2 (Myerson, 1981). For every distribution F ∈ ∆([0, H]), there exists a
second-price auction with reserve price and ironed intervals that for every n ∈ N achieves
maximum revenue from F n among all possible auctions.
Theorem C.3 (Elkind, 2007). Let t ∈ N. There exists an algorithm that runs in time
poly(t), such that given a discrete distribution Fˆ ∈ ∆([0, H]) with support of size at
most t, outputs a second-price auction with reserve price and ironed intervals that for
every n ∈ N achieves maximum revenue from Fˆ n among all possible auctions.
The reader may verify that a Myersonian auction (φi)∈N where φi = φ for some
function φ for all i ∈ N , coincides with a second-price auction with reserve price and
ironed intervals, where the reserve price is φ−1(0), and the ironed intervals are the intervals
on which φ is constant and nonnegative.
C.2 Natural Efficient Distribution-Independent Rounding of
Second-Price Auctions with Reserve Prices
As already noted above, we will now show that rounding the parameters that define a
second-price auction with reserve price and ironed intervals to some fixed precision results
in a loss in revenue of at most that precision on each valuation profile.
Definition C.4 (ε-Rounded-Down Auction). Let ε > 0.
• For every x ∈ R+, let bxcε , ε · bx/εc be the value of x, rounded down to the nearest
integer multiple of ε.
• For every second-price auction with reserve price and ironing intervals (p, I), we
define its ε-rounded-down counterpart b(p, I)cε as follows:
b(p, I)cε ,
(
bpcε,
{[b`cε, bhcε) ∣∣ [`, h) ∈ I & b`cε < bhcε}).
Lemma C.5. For every (p, I), for every ε > 0, for every n ∈ N, and for every v1, . . . , vn ∈
[0, H], it is the case that
rb(p,I)cε(v1, . . . , vn) > r(p,I)(v1, . . . , vn)− ε.
The proof of Lemma C.5 and of other results from this appendix are relegated to
Appendix C.4. Lemma C.5 implies that the loss in revenue is less than an additive ε also
on every distribution.
Proposition C.6. For every (p, I), for every ε > 0, for every F ∈ ∆([0, H]) and for
every n ∈ N, it is the case that
Revb(p,I)cε(F n) > Rev(p,I)(F n)− p · ε,
where p is the probability that some bidder wins in (p, I) when the profile of bids is
distributed according to F n.33
33Interestingly, similarly (at least conceptually) to Proposition 3.7 (and Proposition 6.4), a slightly
stronger statement than that of Proposition C.6 also holds, where p is replaced with the probability that
some bidder wins in A and pays a price that is not an integer multiple of ε when the profile of bids is
distributed according to F . The case analysis is similar to the one in the proof of Lemma C.5, and is
left to the reader.
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We note that Lemma C.5 and Proposition C.6 (and therefore also all of the results of
Appendix C.3) would still hold (via similar analysis) even if we were to ε-round b(p, I)cε
into an ε-coarse auction by rounding its inputs (in addition to the parameters of the
auction) down to the nearest integer multiple of ε before applying its allocation rule (while
adapting the payments accordingly). We further note that a construction similar to that
of Example A.3 in Appendix A shows that the bound of “less than ε” on the revenue loss
in Proposition C.6 (and hence also in Lemma C.5) cannot be unconditionally tightened
any further, even if b(p, I)cε is replaced with an arbitrary ε-coarse auction, and already
for n = 1 bidder (more bidders with the same valuation distribution may be added to
show the same result for n > 1 bidders).
C.3 Uniform Convergence over the Set of
Rounded Second-Price Auctions with Reserve Prices
Analogously to the main text, we obtain a uniform convergence result through showing
that the set of ε-rounded-down second-price auctions with reserve price and ironing in-
tervals is small, and then utilize this and the previous results of this appendix to reprove
the analogous learning result for i.i.d. produce distributions.
Definition C.7 (bScε). For every ε > 0, we denote the set of all ε-rounded-down second-
price auctions with reserve price and ironing intervals with parameters in [0, H] by bScε.
Lemma C.8.
∣∣bScε∣∣ ≤ exp(poly(H, 1/ε)).
Proof. To specify the ironing intervals, it is more than sufficient to merely specify, for
each multiple of ε in [p,H], whether an ironed interval ends at that point, starts at that
point, neither, or both.
To prove an analogous result to Theorem 5.7/Theorem 1.4 for i.i.d. distributions using
the results of Appendix C.2, we require the following analogue of Lemma 5.6.
Lemma C.9. For every ε > 0 and δ > 0, there exists t = poly(H,n, 1/ε, log 1/δ) such
that the following holds. Fix F ∈ ∆([0, H]), draw t samples from F , and let Fˆ be the
empirical uniform distribution over these t samples. With probability at least 1−δ, it is
the case that ∣∣RevA(F n)− RevA(Fˆ n)∣∣ < ε
holds simultaneously for every A ∈ bScε ∪
{
OPT (F n)
}
.
The proof of Lemma C.9 is analogous to that of Lemma 5.6 (taking a union bound
due to the exponential size of bScε), with Proposition 5.4 replaced with the following
analogous proposition for i.i.d. distributions. We phrase and prove the following proposi-
tion as a general probabilistic concentration inequality, which we also find interesting in
its own right. (When reading this proposition, the reader is encouraged to think of the
random variable r as rA for some fixed auction A.)
Proposition C.10. For every ε > 0 and δ > 0, there exists t = poly(H,n, 1/ε, log 1/δ)
such that the following holds. Fix F ∈ ∆([0, H]) and fix r : [0, H]n → [0, H]. Draw
t samples from F , and let Fˆ be the empirical uniform distribution over these t samples.
Then, with probability at least 1−δ it is the case that∣∣ Eˆ
Fn
r − E
Fn
r
∣∣ < ε.
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Remark C.11. We note that Proposition C.10 does not follow from Proposition 5.4
(or from the more general concentration inequality of Babichenko et al., 2017 / Devanur
et al., 2016). Indeed, while in the latter a random tuple from Fˆ1 × · · · × Fˆn distributes
according to F1 × · · · × Fn, in the former a random tuple from Fˆ n does not necessarily
distribute according to F n. Indeed, a random tuple from Fˆ n has, e.g., positive probability
for containing duplicate values, while a random tuple from F n may have (depending on
F ) zero probability for containing duplicate values.
Remark C.12. Concentration inequalities similar to Propositions 5.4 and C.10 can be
similarly shown to hold for cases in which the n distributions (e.g., over valuations of
bidders) are divided into subsets, where in each subset the distributions are i.i.d.
Combining Lemma C.9, Proposition C.6, and Theorem C.3, we obtain the following
analogue of Theorem 5.7/Theorem 1.4, providing a natural polynomial-time algorithm
for learning an approximately optimal auction from samples from an arbitrary unknown
bounded i.i.d. product distribution.
Theorem C.13. There exists t = poly(H,n, 1/ε, log 1/δ) such that the following holds.
Let F be an arbitrary distribution on [0, H]. Draw t samples from F , and let Fˆ be
the empirical distribution over these t samples. Then, with probability at least 1− δ,
the optimal auction for Fˆ n (which can be deterministically computed in time poly(t) via
Theorem C.3), where the reserve price as well as the bounds of each ironed interval are all
rounded down to the nearest multiple of ε/3, approximates the maximum possible revenue
from F n up to less than an additive ε.
C.4 Proofs for Appendix C
Proof Lemma C.5. For a value v ∈ [0, H], define
h(p,I)(v) ,

p v ≤ p
h ∃[`, h) ∈ I : v ∈ [`, h)
v otherwise,
and
`(p,I)(v) ,

p v ≤ p
` ∃[`, h) ∈ I : v ∈ [`, h)
v otherwise,
and note that for a valuation profile with second-highest bid v(2), the revenue from this
profile, assuming that not all bids are lower than the reserve price p, is either h(p,I)(v
(2))
or `(p,I)(v
(2)).
Let (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ [0, H]n be a valuation profile. To show that r(p,I)(v1, . . . , vn) <
rb(p,I)cε(v1, . . . , vn) + ε, we reason by cases. We note that if the revenue from (p, I) is
zero, then there is nothing to prove. We assume therefore that the highest bid is no less
than p, and so also no less than bpcε.
• If the winning bid in (p, I) lies in the same ironed interval (in (p, I)) as another bid:
Let v(2) be the second-highest bid (which may or may not be the winning bid). In
this case, rb(p,I)cε(v1, . . . , vn) ≥ `b(p,I)cε(v(2)) > `(p,I)(v(2))− ε = r(p,I)(v1, . . . , vn)− ε.
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• If the winning bid in (p, I) does not lie in the same ironed interval (in (p, I)) as
another bid:
Let v(2) be the second-highest bid.
– If the winning bid in b(p, I)cε lies in the same ironed interval (in b(p, I)cε) as
another bid:
This means that v(2) lies inside an ironed interval that “before rounding” did
not contain it. Therefore (regardless of whether or not the winning bidder
changed), rb(p,I)cε(v1, . . . , vn) ≥ `b(p,I)cε(v(2)) = bv(2)cε > h(p,I)(v(2)) − ε ≥
r(p,I)(v1, . . . , vn)− ε, as required.
– If the winning bid in b(p, I)cε does not lie in the same ironed interval (in
b(p, I)cε) as another bid:
Recall that the revenue from (p, I) is `(p,I)(v
(2)) if v(2) lies in an ironed interval
(in (p, I)) containing bids only from bidders with indices higher than that of
the winner, and otherwise h(p,I)(v
(2)). Similarly, the revenue from b(p, I)cε
is `b(p,I)cε(v
(2)) if v(2) lies in an ironed interval (in b(p, I)cε) containing bids
only from bidders with indices higher than that of the winner, and otherwise
hb(p,I)cε(v
(2)).
Since hb(p,I)cε(v
(2)) > h(p,I)(v
(2)) − ε and `b(p,I)cε(v(2)) > `(p,I)(v(2)) − ε (and
since h(p,I)(v
(2)) ≥ `(p,I)(v(2)) and hb(p,I)cε(v(2)) ≥ `b(p,I)cε(v(2))), we need only
verify that no significant revenue loss occurred if the winner pays h(p,I)(v
(2)) >
`(p,I)(v
(2)) in (p, I) but pays `b(p,I)cε(v
(2)) < hb(p,I)cε(v
(2)) in b(p, I)cε. In this
case, some bid v′ < v(2) (of a bidder with low index) that lies in the same
ironed interval in (p, I) as v(2) does not lie in the same ironed interval as v(2)
in b(p, I)cε. Furthermore, in this case v(2) lies inside some ironed interval
in b(p, I)cε. This means that v(2) lies inside an ironed interval in b(p, I)cε
that “before rounding” did not contain it. Therefore, rb(p,I)cε(v1, . . . , vn) =
`b(p,I)cε(v
(2)) = bv(2)cε > h(p,I)(v(2))− ε = r(p,I)(v1, . . . , vn)− ε, as required.
Proof of Proposition C.6. Immediate from Lemma C.5, noting that no revenue loss occurs
for valuation profiles for which the auction (p, I) chooses no winner.
Proof of Proposition C.10. The main idea behind the proof is similar to the one behind
that of Proposition 5.4, but keeping the samples independent is somewhat more delicate
and involved. Let v1, . . . , vt be t independently drawn random values sampled from F .
Let
K ,
{
(k1, . . . , kn)
∣∣ k1 = 1 & ∀i ∈ {2, . . . , n} : ki ∈ {1, . . . , t} \ {k1, . . . , ki−1}},
and note that |K| = (t−1)!
(t−n)! . Fix (k1, . . . , kn) ∈ K. Since k1, . . . , kn are distinct, we note
that for every j ∈ {1, . . . , t}, the tuple (vk1+j, . . . , vkn+j) (where addition of ki and j
wraps around from t to 1) is a random sample from F n. We now greedily partition the
set of t n-tuples of indices I = I(k1, . . . , kn) , {k1 + j, k2 + j, . . . , kn + j}tj=1 into sets
such that in each such set, the indices in all coordinates of all n-tuples are distinct. Let
I0 be a maximum subset of I where all indices are distinct, let I1 be a maximum subset
of I \ I0 where all indices are distinct, let I2 be a maximum subset of I \ (I0 ∪ I1) where
all indices are distinct, etc.
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We first claim that I0 ∪ I1 ∪ · · · ∪ In·(n−1) = I, i.e., that this process concludes after at
most n· (n−1)+1 greedy steps. To show this, it is enough to show that |Ii| ≥ |I\{I0,...,Ii−1}|n·(n−1)+1−i
for every i = 0, . . . , n·(n−1), as this implies that In·(n−1) = I \{I0, . . . , In·(n−1)−1}. Indeed,
for each such i, each n-tuple in Ii “intersects” at most n·(n−1) other n-tuples in I (for
every j, the jth coordinate of this n-tuple “intersects” the kth coordinate of precisely one
other n-tuple in I, for k 6= j), at least one of which is contained in each of I0, . . . , Ii−1
(otherwise, this n-tuple could have been added to one of these sets), and so each n-tuple
in Ii “blocks” at most n · (n−1)− i n-tuples from I \ {I1, . . . , Ii−1} from being added
to Ii, obtaining that |Ii| ≥ |I\{I0,...,Ii−1}|n·(n−1)+1−i (under a worst-case scenario where the sets of
“blocked” n-tuples are disjoint for every two “blocking” n-tuples), as required.
By construction, for every i, we have that (vk1+j, . . . , vkn+j) for all j such that
(k1 + j, . . . , kn + j) ∈ Ii, are |Ii| independent random samples from F n. Therefore, for
every i with |Ii| ≥
√
t, letting rik1,...,kn ,
1
|Ii|
∑
(k1+j,...,kn+j)∈Ii r(v
k1+j, . . . , vkn+j), we have
by the Chernoff-Hoeffding Inequality that
P
(∣∣rik1,...,kn − EFn r∣∣ ≥ ε/2) ≤ 2 exp
(
−|Ii|ε
2
2H2
)
≤ 2 exp
(
−
√
tε2
2H2
)
.
Let U(k1, . . . , kn) ,
⋃
i:|Ii|≥
√
t Ii. By definition, for t ≥
(
n · (n − 1) + 1) · √t, there
exists i such that |Ii| ≥
√
t and so we have that
∣∣U(k1, . . . , kn)∣∣ = |I| − ∣∣⋃i:|I|<√t Ii∣∣ >
t− n · (n− 1) · √t.
Let now U ,
⋃
(k1,...,kn)∈K U(k1, . . . , kn). Taking the union bound, we have that
P
(∣∣∣∣( 1|U | ·∑
(k1,...,kn)∈K
i:|Ii(k1,...,kn)|≥
√
t
∣∣Ii| · rik1,...,kn)− EFn r
∣∣∣∣ ≥ ε/2
)
≤ (t− 1)!
(t− n)! ·
(
n · (n− 1) + 1) · 2 exp(−√tε2
2H2
)
.
Noting that by definition,
Eˆ
Fn
r =
|U |
tn
·
≈EFn r︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
|U | ·
∑
(k1,...,kn)∈K
i:|Ii(k1,...,kn)|≥
√
t
|Ii| · rik1,...,kn +
(
1− |U |
tn
)
·
≤H︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
tn−|U | ·
∑
(k1,...,kn)∈
{1,...,t}n\U
r(vk1 , . . . , vkn),
and noting that |U | > |K| · (t−n · (n− 1) ·√t) = (t−1)!
(t−n)! ·
(
t−n · (n− 1) ·√t), we conclude
the proof as there exists t = poly(H,n, 1/ε, log 1/δ) such that both
(t− 1)!
(t− n)! ·
(
n · (n− 1) + 1) · 2 exp(−√tε2
2H2
)
≤ δ and
(t−1)!
(t−n)! ·
(
t− n · (n− 1) · √t)
tn
≥ 1− ε
2H
.
Proof of Lemma C.9. Analogous to the proof of Lemma 5.6, with Snε replaced with bScε,
and with Lemma 5.2 and Proposition 5.4 replaced with Lemma C.8 and Proposition C.10,
respectively.
Proof of Theorem C.13. Analogous to the proof of Theorem 5.7, with Snε/(n+2) replaced
with bScε/3, and with Theorem 2.7, Proposition 4.3, and Lemma 5.6 replaced with The-
orem C.3, Proposition C.6, and Lemma C.9, respectively.
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